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Abstract
Requirements are inherently prone to conflicts. Security, data-minimization, and fairness requirements are no exception.
Importantly, undetected conflicts between such requirements can lead to severe effects, including privacy infringement and
legal sanctions. Detecting conflicts between security, data-minimization, and fairness requirements is a challenging task, as
such conflicts are context-specific and their detection requires a thorough understanding of the underlying business processes.
For example, a processmay require anonymous execution of a task that writes data into a secure data storage, where the identity
of the writer is needed for the purpose of accountability. Moreover, conflicts not arise from trade-offs between requirements
elicited from the stakeholders, but also from misinterpretation of elicited requirements while implementing them in business
processes, leading to a non-alignment between the data subjects’ requirements and their specifications. Both types of conflicts
are substantial challenges for conflict detection. To address these challenges, we propose a BPMN-based framework that
supports: (i) the design of business processes considering security, data-minimization and fairness requirements, (ii) the
encoding of such requirements as reusable, domain-specific patterns, (iii) the checking of alignment between the encoded
requirements and annotated BPMN models based on these patterns, and (iv) the detection of conflicts between the specified
requirements in the BPMN models based on a catalog of domain-independent anti-patterns. The security requirements were
reused from SecBPMN2, a security-oriented BPMN 2.0 extension, while the fairness and data-minimization parts are new.
For formulating our patterns and anti-patterns, we extended a graphical query language called SecBPMN2-Q. We report on
the feasibility and the usability of our approach based on a case study featuring a healthcare management system, and an
experimental user study.
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today’s systems and organizations, and the advances in the
amount of storage and processing power have raised public
awareness on privacy [18] and data-misuse concerns [17].
Key data protection concepts are data minimization [29,
71] and fairness [3,15]. Data-minimization aims at minimiz-
ing “the possibility to collect personal data about others” and
“within the remaining possibilities, [to minimize] collecting
personal data” (Pfitzmann et al. in [53], p. 6). Fairness aims to
ensure equal treatment between data subjects by preventing
the misuse of data in decision-making processes to discrimi-
nate data subjects on the ground of protected data as defined
by laws or organizational policies [8,26]. For example, Arti-
cle 22(4)of theEuropeanGeneralDataProtectionRegulation
(GDPR, [56]) prohibits decision making based on protected
data as defined in Article 9 of the same regulation, such as
ethnicity, religion, and gender.
Apart from security concepts such as confidentiality and
integrity, five data-minimization concepts, namely
Pseudonymity, Anonymity, Unlinkability, Undetectability,
and Unobservability, and two fairness concepts, namely
Individual- and Group Fairness, are considered funda-
mental to avoid fairness and privacy threats, respectively.
Data-minimization concepts were first defined by Pfitz-
mann et al. [53] and later included in the ISO 15408 standard
of common criteria for information technology security eval-
uation [33]. The two fairness concepts are formally explored
by many research works in the algorithmic fairness field
[3,24].
While privacy-enhancing technologies [75] and algorith-
mic fairness techniques [78], respectively, address-specific
data-minimization and fairness needs, security, privacy, and
fairness violations often do not come from loopholes in
the applied protection technologies [30], but from conflicts
between data protection interests at the business level of the
target system [5,27–30,48]. For example, according to recent
research from Google AI [28], one of the main challenges in
the field of the algorithmic fairness are conflicts between
data-minimization and fairness requirements.
The variety of requirements arising from security, data
protection, and fairness considerations give rise to vari-
ous types of conflicts. Two main sources of such conflicts
are clashes between needs and misinterpretation of require-
ments.
Clashes between the system users’ needs. Data subjects
may require that any activity with a decision-making pur-
pose should not be able to distinguishwhether their protected
data exist or not in the data store from where the activity
retrieves data (Undetectability). This requirement may inter-
ferewith anorganization’s needs. In some scenarios, different
treatments between data subjects might be authorized. For
example, it might be legal that car insurers charge a pre-
mium to male drivers to account for gender differences in
accident rates [8].
Misinterpretation of requirements. Misinterpretation of
the elicited requirements can happen intentionally or unin-
tentionally while implementing the requirements in business
processes. For example, for two persons who only differ in
their gender and are otherwise identical, the activity may
be required to produce the same output (Individual Fair-
ness). To fulfill this requirement, a business analyst may
specify that the gender attribute should not be accessed by
the decision-making activity. However, this solution does not
prevent indirect discrimination [17], which may arise from
the availability of data that are highly correlated with gender,
such as a person’s first name. In fact, to prevent indirect dis-
crimination, it might be necessary to access a protected data
attribute and use it to identify correlated data.
Challenges A few existing approaches are available to deal
with different types of data protection requirements in the
early stages of development. These approaches focus on
the identification of security and data-minimization require-
ments at the elicitation phase without analyzing conflicts
between them [9,18,34,49]. The output of these approaches
is usually a set of textual requirements.
Relying on textually specified data protection require-
ments to manually discover conflicts between them is a
difficult and error-prone task for two main reasons.
First, conflicts between the data protection requirements
depend on the context of how the technical and organiza-
tional components of the target system interact with each
other. Specifically, conflicts not only result from trade-offs
between requirements related to the same asset in the system
(e.g., anonymous vs. accountable execution of a task), but
also from those related to different assets. For example, a task
may be required to be executed anonymously, while writing
data to a secure data storage where the identity of the writer
must be known for accountability reasons. The detection of
such conflicts requires an understanding of the underlying
business processes and their included interactions between
security and data-minimization requirements, which is a dif-
ficult task if the requirements are provided in a textual format
and distributed through multiple documents.
Second, a single data protection concept may have multi-
ple meanings based onwhat (which of the system assets) and
from whom (i.e., adversary type) to protect. These variations
make it hard to decide whether two specific requirements
are conflicting. For example, providing fully anonymous
execution of a specific task hinders the ability of the sys-
tem to keep the task’s executor accountable, leading to a
conflict. In contrast, providing partial anonymity by means
of using pseudonyms is not conflicting with accountability.
Such details, if provided in a textual format, will make it dif-
ficult to keep track of what should be protected, from whom
it should be protected, and how it should be protected.
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Furthermore, as far as our knowledge goes, no approach
supports fairness requirements in the early stages of system
development. Detecting conflicts between fairness and other
data protection requirements in the early stages of the system
development is, therefore, currently not possible. Although a
textual syntax with precise semantics amenable to automatic
analysis may be a solution to address the above challenges,
we believe that expressing conflicts between data protection
requirements as graphical patterns during the design of the
business process models of a system is a powerful way to
communicate conflictswith the system’s stakeholders.More-
over, a graphical solution helps to manage the complexity of
the models of large-scale real-world systems.
Our previous contributions To the best of our knowl-
edge, apart from our earlier work [60], there exist no
other approaches to detect conflicts between data protection
requirements in the design of a given system. In [60], we
proposed an extension of the Business Process Modeling
Notation (BPMN 2.0, [7]) supporting: (i) the specification
of security and data-minimization requirements in BPMN
models, (ii) the detection of conflicts between security
and data-minimization requirements based on a catalog of
domain-independent anti-patterns. We reused the security
annotations from an existing security-oriented BPMN exten-
sion called SecBPMN2 [67]. To express the anti-patterns, we
extended a graphical query language for BPMN 2.0 models
called SecBPMN2-Q [67].
Our contribution in this paper This paper presents an
extension of our earlier conference paper [60] in three main
directions: First, in order to address the challenge of possible
non-alignments between the users’ needs and their specifica-
tions in business process models, we propose an alignment
checking technique based on reusable domain-specific pat-
terns. Second, in addition to data minimization and security,
we also address conflicts related to fairness, which represents
one of the main challenges in the field of algorithmic fairness
[28]. Third, we performed a more comprehensive experi-
mental evaluation, involving a larger set of participants and
contrasting subjective usefulness assessments with objective
performance measurements. Specifically, our contributions
in this paper are:
– a semi-automated process for supporting: (i) the enrich-
ment of BPMNmodels with security, data-minimization,
and fairness requirements, (ii) the encoding of such
requirements as reusable, domain-specific patterns, (iii)
the checking of alignment between the encoded require-
ments and annotated BPMN models based on these
patterns, and (iv) conflict detection between the require-
ments in annotated BPMN models based on a catalog of
domain-independent anti-patterns,
– an extension to the catalog of the domain-independent
anti-patterns in [60] to support the automatic con-
flict detection of among security, fairness, and data-
minimization requirements, where each anti-pattern rep-
resents a conflict or potential conflict,
– a case study featuring a healthcare management system,
showing how our process can be used to uncover con-
flicts between security, data-minimization and fairness
requirements, and
– a user evaluation, in which we studied the usefulness of
our conflict detection technique in an experiment with 30
participants.
The paper is organized as it follows. Section 2 provides
the necessary background. Section 3 describes our proposed
framework. Section 4 introduces our BPMN extension. Sec-
tion 5 presents our alignment verification approach. Section 6
presents our conflict detection approach. Section 7 presents
the tool support for our approach. Sections 8 and 9 are
devoted to the validation based on a case study and a user
evaluation. Sections 10, 11, and 12 discuss limitations of our
current approach, survey related work, and conclude, respec-
tively.
2 Background
We introduce the fundamental data-minimization and fair-
ness concepts used in our work, and a BPMN-oriented
security engineering approach whose security concepts were
reused.
Data-minimization concepts Pfitzmann et al. [53] define
five data minimization concepts that can be refined into pri-
vacy requirements for the target system [9,18,34,49]. In the
following, the five data-minimization concepts that are con-
sidered in our work are listed, each with its definition as
provided in [53]: (i) Anonymity is the inability of an adver-
sary to sufficiently identify a subject within a set of subjects,
called the anonymity set. (ii) Pseudonymity is a special case
of anonymity where a pseudonym is used as an identifier for
a data subject other than one of the data subject’s personal
identifiable information. (iii) Unlinkability is the inability of
an adversary to sufficiently distinguish whether two Items Of
Interests (IOIs, e.g., subjects, messages, actions, …) within
a system are related or not. Although it is not explicitly
mentioned in [53], the definition of unlinkability implies
that the two or more IOIs are of comparable types, other-
wise it is infeasible to make the comparison [18, p. 8]. (iv)
Undetectability is the inability of an adversary to sufficiently
distinguish whether an IOI exists or not. By the definition
[53], undetectability of an IOI can only hold against outsider
adversary (i.e., neither being the system nor one of the par-
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ticipants in processing the IOI). (v) Unobservability is the
undetectability of an IOI against all subjects uninvolved in it
(i.e., outsider adversary) and the anonymity of the subject(s)
involved in the IOI against other subject(s) involved in that
IOI (i.e., insider adversaries).
Fairness concepts Although there is no agreement in the
literature on the definition of fairness, two main types of
fairness are distinguished [3]: we have Individual fairness
if an activity with a decision-making purpose produces the
same output for every two data subjects whose data are iden-
tical excerpt for data that have been defined as protected data.
We have Group fairness if a decision-making activity pro-
duces equally distributed outputs for each protected group.
Consider, for example, a decision-making activity in a bank
to decide if loan applicants should be given loans. We say
that the activity preserves individual fairness with respect to
gender if the activity produces the same result (i.e., loan vs.
not loan) for every two identical loan applicants who dif-
fer only in their gender. We say the activity preserves group
fairness with respect to gender if the outcome fractions of
males and females who will get a loan are equal. It is worth
mentioning that protected data are not limited to those listed
as protected by the laws and regulations. Depending on the
organizations’ policies and the context, other data may be
considered as protected. For example, the type of technology
that people use to access the web is not considered as pro-
tected data in Article 9 of the GDPR [56], but it can act as
protected in the policies of a specific organization in the case
of, for example, advertising decisions.
However, avoiding using protected data in a decision-
making activity does not necessarily ensure fairness. Other
data may act as proxies for protected data due to corre-
lations between them, and as a consequence, may lead to
indirect discrimination [16]. For example, in 2016, it was
found that a decision-making software byAmazon.com, Inc.,
excluded minority neighborhoods with the African Ameri-
can community in theUSA from being able to participate in a
delivery-free service, although the software did not explicitly
use ethnicity for making the decisions [32]. The decision on
whether a piece of data is correlated with a protected charac-
teristic or not depends on correlation metrics and a threshold
value that can be specified by domain experts. On the other
hand, discrimination on the ground of protected data might
be allowed if there is a legitimate purpose that can justify it.
For example, it might be legal to discriminate on age for life
insurance decisions. Data whose effect on the outputs of a
decision-making activity can be justified are called explana-
tory data [73].
BPMN-based security engineering Modeling security
requirements during the design phase of the business pro-
cesses models is a promising research direction in the field of
security engineering [40]. The key idea is to extend graphical
business process modeling languages such as BPMN [7] to
support the modeling and analysis of security requirements.
Despite the availability of various BPMN-based security
extensions [40], support for data-minimization and fairness
requirements in business process models is sparse. For data-
minimization requirements, we are only aware of the work
proposed in [62], which considers one data-minimization
requirement, namely anonymity. However, fairness and fur-
ther data-minimization requirements such as unlinkability
and undetectability were not addressed yet. Readers inter-
ested in a comprehensive overview of the concepts that have
been considered by the previous BPMN security extensions
are referred to Maines et al.’s survey in [40].
To capture conflicts between security, data-minimization,
and fairness requirements, a unified framework for mod-
eling these types of requirements is needed. Compared to
other approaches, we found that the security concepts from
SecBPMN2 [67] offer the following advantages: (i) in con-
trast to the research work in [6,10,36,45,62,65,77] which
support only a restricted set of security aspects, SecBPMN2
enriches BPMN 2.0 modeling language with ten security-
specific concepts. In what follows, we list the ten security
concepts that are supported by SecBPMN2, each with its
corresponding annotation and definition as provided in [67]:
Accountability specifies that the system should hold
the executors of the activities responsible for their actions.
Authenticity imposes that the identity of a given activity’s
executor must be verified, or that it should be possible to
prove a given data object as genuine, respectively. Auditabil-
ity indicates that it should be possible to keep track of all
actions performed by an executor or accessor of an activity,
data object, or message flow. Non-delegation specifies
that an activity shall be executed only by assigned users.
Non-repudiation imposes that an executor or accessor of
an activity, data object, or message flow should not be able to
deny his/her actions. Binding of duties and Separation of
duties requires that the same person or different persons
should be responsible for the completion of two related tasks,
respectively.Confidentiality and Integrity indicate that
only authorized users are allowed to read ormodify data from
a given activity, message flow, or data object, respectively.
Availability indicates that it should be possible to ensure
that an activity, data object, or message flow is available and
operational when they are required by authorized users.
Reusing these concepts allows us to study interactions
between a comprehensive set of security, data-minimization,
and fairness requirements, enabling a powerful approach to
conflict detection. (ii) While other works [50,76] use textual
stereotypes to enrich business process models with secu-
rity requirements (e.g., «confidentiality»), SecBPMN2, as
illustrated in the previous paragraph, representing security
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Fig. 1 Semi-automated conflict detection BPMN-based process proposed in this paper
requirements using graphical annotations [67]. Compared to
textual annotations, graphical ones can reduce the cognitive
complexity for understanding the resulting business process
models [47], and as a result, contribute to usability.
In addition, (iii) SecBPMN2 provides a security query
language for specifying queries that can be matched against
a given SecBPMN2 model, called SecBPMN2-Q [67]. We
reuse and extend this query language in our approach for
two dependent purposes: first, formulating the security, data-
minimization, and fairness requirements of the system in
questions as patterns that can be used later for reasoning
about the alignment between these requirements and the cor-
responding SecBPMN2 model of the system to be. Second,
specifying domain-independent conflicts between security,
data-minimization, and fairness requirements as anti-patterns
that can be used later for uncovering conflicts in SecBPMN2
models. To this end, inwhat follows, the data-protection con-
cept, otherwise it is mentioned, is used to refer to all security,
data-minimization, and fairness concepts that are considered
in this paper.
For query evaluation, SecBPMN2-Q uses an artificial
intelligence system based on disjunctive logic programming,
DLV [39]. In particular, it is based on planner functional-
ity called DLV-K [21]. The planner uses a knowledge base
and defines possible plans to be executed in order to achieve
given objectives. In the case of SecBPMN2, the knowledge
base consists of the business process(es) analyzed, while the
objectives are the patterns to verify. SecBPMN2 instructs
DLV-K to search possible executions of the process(es) that
satisfy the patterns; if it finds at least one, it means that the
pattern is matched. This solution allows overcoming perfor-
mance issues due to the possible very complex design of
business processes.
3 Process
Detecting conflicts between data protection requirements is
a challenging task. Since such conflicts are context-specific,
their detection requires a thorough understanding of the
underlying business processes [60]. As mentioned in Sect. 1,
sometimes the source of conflicts is a non-alignment between
the requirements and their implementations in the busi-
ness processes. The main source of non-alignment issues is
when the business analysts who are responsible for model-
ing the business processes misunderstand the requirements
specifications or deliberately deviate from them due to busi-
ness needs [67]. These deviations may result in unexpected
conflicts between the requirements and, as a consequence,
lead to security or privacy vulnerabilities. This is not a
new conclusion but a fundamental expectation. For exam-
ple, Kim et al. [35] define requirements conflicts in software
engineering as “The interactions and dependencies between
requirements that can lead to negative or undesired opera-
tion of the system.”
To overcome these challenges, we propose in this section
a semi-automated process for conflict detection, as shown in
Fig. 1 that permits:
– to ensure that the specified data protection requirements
in a business process model are aligned with the elicited
requirements. As byproducts, first, conflicts that may
happen due to the non-alignment reason can be avoided,
and second, the efforts that are needed for specifying the
source of conflicts in later stages for resolving conflicts
will be reduced, as the possibility that a detected conflict
might result from a non-alignment is excluded.
– to detect and report conflicts between data protection
requirements that are hard to foresee based on textually
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specified requirements (due to the earlier described chal-
lenges in Sect. 1).
Roles and assumptions about their skills The process pro-
posed in this paper can be executed by a team of business
analysts and requirements engineers. The business analysts
are responsible for designing a BPMN model enriched with
elicited data protection requirements. The requirements engi-
neers are responsible for modeling elicited requirements
as procedural business process patterns that can be auto-
matically matched to the enriched BPMN model with data
protection requirements. The mapping between the elicited
requirements and the procedural patterns is not a one-to-
one mapping, as it might be preferable to model two or
more supplementing requirements in one procedural pattern.
Two or more requirements are considered as supplement-
ing requirements if they support each other toward achieving
shared goals. For example, confidentiality and integrity are
two supplementing security requirements that aim to prevent
unauthorized access and modification for system resources.
Moreover, since business projects within the same domain
can sharemany procedural business practices [23], some data
protection patterns can be defined in a domain-specific way
to allow their reuse in future business projects within the
same domain. Thereby, requirements engineers do not need
to create patterns for all the elicited requirements every time
a new business project starts.
However, decisions about when two ormore requirements
can be considered as supplementing and when a procedural
pattern can be specified in a domain-specific way are critical
and require domain knowledge and solid background knowl-
edge about the considered data protection requirements. To
this end, our assumptions on the skills of the involved busi-
ness analysts are lightweight, as they do not have to be data
protection experts. The involved business analysts have to
be trained on using our proposed extension of SecBPMN2.
Still, to ensure the correct use of our approach, some addi-
tional background about the data protection concepts that are
used in our approach on top of their training is appropriate.
While in addition to the training,weassumemore skills on the
involved requirements engineers, as they have to be domain
expertswith a remarkable set of skills in data protection.With
these assumptions, our aim is to address the common situa-
tion in which data protection experts are not always available
in all system development phases [31]. In this situation, we
aim to support non-experts stakeholders with tools to report
on non-aligned and conflicting data protection requirements.
However, even in the presence of data protection experts in
every phase of our process—which is clearly the preferable
situation—our process can still be helpful, as the involved
expert and non-expert stakeholders benefit from the early
conflict detection as during the business processes modeling
phase.
Inputs Three inputs are required: first, a requirements doc-
ument containing data protection requirements. During the
requirements elicitation phase of the system development,
the business analysts produce this document while interact-
ing with the users. Second, a set of reusable domain-specific
patterns, each of them specifying a particular data protection
requirement. The patterns are designed as graphical queries
using our extension of SecBPMN2-Q. Having a repository
of these patterns allows to reuse them over similar projects
in the same domain (such as healthcare in our upcoming
running example) while ensuring that new patterns can be
added on demand. Third, a domain-independent conflicts
catalog. This catalog is one of our main contributions and
it resulted from our analysis of all possible situations where
conflicts or potential conflicts between a security, a data-
minimization, and a fairness requirement may happen. For
each identified situation, we specified an anti-pattern using
the SecBPMN2-Q. The conflicts catalog proposed in this
paper extends our conflicts catalog proposed in [60] with
anti-patterns for expressing conflicts between fairness and
data-minimization requirements. Details of our catalog are
described in Sect. 6.
Outputs As shown in Fig. 1, the outputs of the process
are: (i) a SecBPMN2 model enriched with data protection
requirements; (ii) a set of SecBPMN2-Q patterns which can
be used to check the alignment of these requirements with
the enriched SecBPMN2model; (iii) a textual alignment ver-
ification report that describes the mismatched patterns in the
SecBPMN2model; and (iv) a textual conflict detection report
that describes the detected conflicts in the SecBPMN2model.
On demand, both the non-aligned and the conflicting require-
ments can be highlighted in the SecBPMN2 model.
Our process consists of four phases. The numbers in Fig. 1
represent the phases, described below.
Phase 1 In this phase, business analysts manually model the
business processes of the target system, one process at a
time, with respect to the data protection needs. The busi-
ness analysts derive business processes from the provided
requirements document to create a BPMN model, and they
use our extension of the SecBPMN2 language to enrich the
BPMNmodelwith data protection requirements, again based
on the requirements document. The output model is stored
as a SecBPMN2 model. Detailed description of our extension
to the SecBPMN2 language is provided in Sect. 4.
Phase 2 In this phase, requirements engineers, first, iden-
tify the set of domain-specific patterns to be reused for
alignment checking for the business process model in ques-
tion. This step can be performed by mapping data protection
requirements extracted from the requirements document to
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existing domain-specific patterns. Second, design patterns
for those data protection requirements do not have corre-
sponding patterns. Newly identified domain-specific patterns
may be added to the patterns’ repository. Patterns can be
formulated in our specialized query language that extends
SecBPMN2-Q [67]. For managing the patterns, we assume
a certain directory structure, based on naming conventions.
The management is currently performed manually; we dis-
cuss automation opportunities as part of future work.
The output of this phase, as shown in Fig. 1, is a set of
SecBPMN2-Q patterns that combines all the new patterns
from the second step with the retrieved ones from the first
step, which, for alignment checking, will be automatically
matched to the SecBPMN2 model obtained in phase 1. Note
that, as shown in Fig. 1, phase 1 and phase 2 can be exe-
cuted in parallel. Details description of our extension to the
SecBPMN2-Q is given in Sect. 5.
Phase 3 In real-world scenarios, the number of elicited
requirements and the size of the business process models
tend to be large, making it difficult for the involved analysts
to manually check whether the requirements are correctly
specified in the business process models or not [70]. To sup-
port an automatic check, we extended the query engine of
SecBPMN2-Q [67], which permits an alignment checking
of security requirements and SecBPMN2 models based on
SecBPMN2-Q patterns. Our extension supports the align-
ment checking of procedural data-minimization and fairness
requirements as well.
The inputs of alignment checking are a SecBPMN2 model
enrichedwith data protection requirements from phase 1; and
the data protection requirements specified as SecBPMN2-Q
patterns from phase 2. The output is an alignment checking
report that describes the mismatched patterns. In case mis-
matchedpatterns are reported, the process inFig. 1 starts from
the beginning. This will give the stakeholders two options
for fixing the sources of mismatching: first, in phase 1, the
requirements specifications in the SecBPMN2 model can be
fixed tomatch their specifications in themismatchedpatterns.
Second, in phase 2, the specifications of the mismatched
patterns can be relaxed to match their counterparts in the
SecBPMN2 model. This process should be repeated until
the alignment is ensured; after that phase 4 can start. More
details on alignment checking are given in Sect. 5.
Phase 4Detecting conflicts between data protection require-
ments during the design of the business processes models
can help in reducing the needed effort to fix the conflicts if
they are discovered in later development phases. However,
due to the lack of experts and since the business process
models frequently are composed of many tasks, a manual
detection for conflicts between data protection requirements
in the business process models is an error-prone task.
One possible scenario to avoid having conflicting require-
ments in the designed business process is to design a tool that
prevents a business analyst from being able to enrich a busi-
ness process model with conflicting requirements in phase
1. However, since the data protection requirements represent
preferences for different users in the system, decisions about
resolving conflicts during the run-time of designing a busi-
ness process model cannot be easily taken. Conflicts should
be reported and discussed with the stakeholders. Therefore,
this phase supports automatic detection and reporting for
conflicts between specified security, data-minimization, and
fairness requirements in the input model.
As shown in Fig. 1, the inputs of this phase are: first,
a SecBPMN2 model that is aligned with the data protection
requirements. Second, the domain-independent conflicts cat-
alog as SecBPMN2-Q anti-patterns. These anti-patterns can
then be automaticallymatched to the SecBPMN2model. The
conflict detection benefits from our query engine from phase
3. The output of this phase is a conflict detection report that
textually shows conflicts in the SecBPMN2 model as errors
and potential conflicts as warnings to the user. Details about
this phase are given in Sect. 6.
4 Modeling security-, data-minimization-
and fairness-aware BPMNmodels
In this section, we propose a BPMN extension for specifying
security, data-minimization, and fairness requirements. Our
support for data-minimization and fairness requirements for
the design of business processes is new, while the security-
specific elements are reused from SecBPMN2, an existing
security-oriented BPMN extension. In the following, we first
present a running example and then a complete description
of our extension.
Running Example Figure 2 represents a business process
in the context of healthcare management. A patient uses a
telemedicine device to receive an over-distance healthcare
service and evaluates the service through an online evaluation
portal. A patient who wishes to donate in one of his vital
organs can fill a donation form and send it through an online
donation portal.
Executors of a business process are represented by pools
and lanes such as “Tele-medicine Device” and “System Portal”,
respectively. Communication between pools is represented
bymessage flows; the content of such communications is rep-
resented using message. For example, “Tele-medicine Device”
sends the message “measures” to “System Portal”.
Atomic actions are represented with tasks, for example
“measure vital signs”. A task is positioned inside a pool with
the meaning that the actor represented by the pool will exe-
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Fig. 2 Running example: Specifying security, data-minimization, and fairness requirements in a healthcare business process
cute the task. For example, “measure vital signs” task will be
executed by “Tele-medicine Device”.
Data Objects represent data used in a business process
model. For example “EHR” represents an electronic healthcare
record, i.e., data about patients. Data objects are connected to
tasks using a data association: a directional relation used to
model the flow of data between a task and a data object. If a
data association starts from a data objects and targets a task,
then the task reads the data object. If the data association
targets the data objects, then the task writes the data object.
If the data object is connected to the same task with two
data associations with different orientations, then the task
modifies the data object. For instance, “Check the case” task
reads the “EHR” data object, while “Update the EHR” writes the
same data object.
Events represent external actions/states that interact with a
business process. Events in SecBPMN2 are represented with
circles. There are two types of events (relevant for the purpose
of this paper): (i) start event, which represents the initial
point of a business process; (ii) end event which represents
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Fig. 3 All variants of SecBPMN’s Non-repudiation annotation
the terminal point of a business process. For example, the
start event of the process executed in the pool “Tele-medicine
Device” specifies that the process will start every 2 h, while
the two start events in the swimlane “System portal” specify
that the processes will start when a message is received.
Gateways specify deviations of the execution sequence;
they split the processes into two or more branches and allow
to execute one branch based on a specified condition. For
example, the gateway “measures>=config?” in swimlane “Sys-
tem portal”, specifies that if “measures” is higher than the
parameter “config”, then the right branch is executed, oth-
erwise, the left branch is executed.
Security concepts are represented with orange annota-
tions. SecBPMN2 supports ten security-specific annotations.
However, for the scopeof this paper,weuseonly four of them,
described below.
Confidentiality ( ) is associated with message flows,
meaning that the content of the message is to be preserved
and not to be accessed by unauthorized users, respectively.
Depending on the security mechanism used to enforce such
security annotations, the communication channel that is used
to exchange the messages, represented in the business pro-
cess, will encrypt messages or use technologies such as
virtual private networks (VPN).
Accountability ( ) can be associated with tasks and
expresses the need for monitoring the execution of the tasks.
In Fig. 2, the accountability annotation that is associatedwith
the “Send data to portal” task meaning that the task’s executor
must be monitored. In general, implementing such monitors
will require a monitoring component that intercepts the calls
to the tasks or store the logs of the execution of the task, for
later inspections.
Bind of Duty ( ) requires the same actor to be responsible
for the completion of a set of related activities. This anno-
tation must be linked to two pools or two lanes. It can be
enforced using an access control security mechanism, which
forces a set of activities to be executed by the same user.
Non-repudiation ( ) indicates that the execution (or non-
execution) of a BPMN element must be provable.
Some of the security annotations can be defined in one or
more variants, depending on which element the annotation
is connected. For example, Non-repudiation ( ) has three
variants. The variants’ definitions are shown in Fig. 3.
Our new fairness and data-minimization concepts, dis-
cussed below, are represented with yellow annotations,
expressing that these concepts are more directly related to
privacy than security.
Data-minimization and fairness annotations To allow
annotating BPMN models with data-minimization and fair-
ness requirements, we extended the artifact class from
BPMN with five concepts, namely anonymity ( ), unde-
tectability ( ), unlinkability ( ), unobservability ( ), and
fairness ( ). The first four concepts are data-minimization-
specific. The meta-model of our BPMN extension with
data-minimization and fairness concepts is shown in Fig. 4.
Gray parts in the meta-model represent part of SecBPMN2
elements. White parts are new elements.
Since an additional concept described by Pfitzmann et al.,
pseudonymity, is a special case of anonymity, we use
one annotation for both concepts. Similarly, since both
individual- and group fairness concepts are special types of
fairness, as described in Sect. 2, we use the same annotation
for both of them. However, to allow capturing the varia-
tions between these concepts, a type attribute in the fairness
annotation allows specifying the fairness type (i.e., group- or
individual fairness), while a level attribute in the anonymity
annotation allows specifying the required level of anonymity
(i.e., full anonymous vs. pseudonymous). Using one annota-
tion to represent related concepts is recommended to reduce
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Fig. 4 Meta-model of our BPMN extension. Attributes show their default values
graphical complexity [40]. For the same purpose, we intro-
duced a specific annotation for unobservability, although
unobservability, by definition, can be achieved by preserv-
ing both anonymity and undetectability.
We designed the graphical syntax of these annotations
by following Moody’s guidelines for increasing the usabil-
ity of modeling languages [47]. The data-minimization and
fairness annotations share two common visual aspects with
the security annotations of the SecBPMN2; they all have
a solid texture, and a circular shape; they differ in their
fill color, using yellow instead of orange. We believe that
having different colors for security on the one hand and
fairness and data-minimization annotations, on the other
hand, contributes to usability, as one can easily distinguish
between fairness and data-minimization annotations from
security ones. Given the graphical syntax of our annotations
is described, in what follows, we describe the meta-model of
our BPMN extension.
A special type of association called SecurityAssociation
is used to link the proposed annotations with elements in the
business process model. Each of the proposed annotations is
constrained to be linked with one or a list of BPMN elements
of the following types: activity, message flow, data associa-
tion, or data object, that is, to avoid overlapping semantics of
different annotations. For example, two messages cannot be
linked to each other as related (i.e., unlinkability) if they are
sent anonymously (i.e., anonymity). Therefore, having both
unlinkability and anonymity annotations for message flows
would be redundant. The linkage constraints are enforced
by the SecBPMN2 editor to prevent some annotations from
being linked with wrong BPMN elements. Detailed descrip-
tion of the linkage constraints and the rationale beyond them
are provided in “Appendix A”.
Our proposed data protection annotations have a reference
to theMechanism class called enforcedBy. This reference can
be used as an attribute to allow business analysts to spec-
ify the mechanism(s) needed to enforce a data-minimization
and fairness requirement in later phases of development.
Other details for specifying data-minimization and fair-
ness requirements are captured using other attributes. For
example, in the case of a fairness annotation, specific ref-
erences can be used to describe in particular protected and
explanatory data, which are described in Sect. 2. To reduce
specification overhead, the proposed annotations have an
attribute autoPropagated which supports the propagation of
the requirement to other elements in the model. Four cases
are possible, depending on the type of the element the anno-
tation is linked with: (1) for an activity, the requirement is
propagated to all following tasks in the same lane, (2) for a
message flow, the requirement is propagated to all message
flows that goes from the source pool of the considered mes-
sage flow to its target pool, (3) for a data input association, the
requirement is propagated to all data input associations that
read data from that data object in the same lane, and (4) for a
data output association, the requirement is propagated to all
data output associations that write data to that data object in
the same lane.
In the rest of this section, the annotations proposed in this
paper are defined. Each of them is defined in terms of one
or more variants, since the semantic of annotations changes
based on which element the annotation is connected. The
definitions are summarized in Fig. 5. In the following, we
describe the definitions and the attributes that can be used to
shape the exact semantic of the annotation.
Anonymity, as shown in Fig. 5, comes in four variants. (i)
Anonymity-Activity specifies that the executor of the task
should be anonymous within a set of executors for the task
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Fig. 5 All variants of our data-minimization and fairness annotations
with respect to a given adversary perspective. (ii)Anonymity-
MessageFlow specifies that the sender of the message should
be anonymous within a set of senders for the message with
respect to a given adversary perspective. (iii) Anonymity-
DataInputAssociation specifies that the task should only
read an anonymized variant of a predefined list of sensitive
data when retrieved from the data object. (iv) Anonymity-
DataOutputAssociation specifies that the task should not
write a predefined list of sensitive data to the data object.
Basedonourmeta-model inFig. 4, the following attributes
can be used to shape the exact semantic of the anonymity
annotation; the reference attribute protectDataSubjectRole
specifies the roles who can execute an activity or send a mes-
sage in case anonymity linked to an activity or a message
flow, respectively. While in case anonymity linked to a data
association, it specifies the roles of the data subjects whom
the data are about. The reference attribute anonymizedWithin
can be used to specify the anonymity set that an involved data
subject should be anonymous within. In case anonymity is
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linked to a data association, the reference attribute anonymize
can be used to specify the list of sensitive data that should
be anonymized when writing/reading them to/from a data
object.
The attribute level specifies the required anonymity level
(i.e., full anonymous or pseudonymous). In some scenarios,
the system requires that the executor of an activity should be
accountable, and thus, pseudonyms should be used to de-
identify the executor of the activity. The attribute insider
specifies against who to protect. The considered adversary
type is either just outsider (false) or both outsider and insider
(true). We define the outsider adversary as any entity being
part of the surrounding of the system considered. The insider
is any entity being part of the system considered, including
the system itself.
The example model Fig. 2 shows three anonymity anno-
tations associated with different BPMN elements. Consider,
for example, the one associated with the “Fill evaluation form”
activity, which is at the right hand of the model. This anno-
tation specifies that a patient shall be able to execute the “Fill
evaluation form” task anonymouslywithin the set of all patients
without being identifiable by either outsider or insider adver-
saries. The annotation suggests to use the “zero-knowledge
proof” [46] mechanism to enforce anonymous authentication.
Since the requirement is propagated, the same requirement
applies to the “Submit evaluation” task.
Unlinkability, as shown in Fig. 5, comes in two variants. (i)
Unlinkability-Process can be linked with two pools/lanes to
specify that an adversary of the given type shall not be able
to link two executed processes as related. In other words, if
linked to two pools, this annotation imposes that a subject
may make use of multiple services without allowing others
to link these uses together as related [53]. (ii) Unlinkability-
DataObject can be linked with two data objects to specify
that from the given adversary perspective, it should not be
possible to link the two data objects as related. Specifically,
if linked to two data objects, this annotation specifies that the
two data objects should do not share data that allow others to
profile a data subject by linking information from different
sources about the data subject as related to each other.
Based on our meta-model in Fig. 4, the reference attribute
protectDataSubjectRole can be used to specify the data sub-
jects who should be protected from the linkability threats
in term of using their roles. Since unlinkability can only be
applied to two specific processes or data objects, it cannot
be propagated to other elements. The attacker type is spec-
ified using the insider attribute, in the same way as in the
anonymity case.
The example model shown in Fig. 2 includes two unlink-
ability annotations. Consider, for example, the unlinkability
annotation associated with the two data objects namely, “EHR”
and “Evaluation”. This annotation specifies that both outsider
and insider adversaries must not be able to link an “EHR” and
an “Evaluation” data objects as related. The annotation sug-
gests using the “Role-based Access Control Mechanism (RBAC)”
[25] and the “k-anonymity” [72] mechanisms to enforce this
requirement. We did not show these specifications in Fig. 2
to keep the model readable.
Undetectability, as shown in Fig. 5, comes in three vari-
ants. (i) Undetectability-Activity specifies that an adversary
should not be able to detect whether an activity is executed.
(ii) Undetectability-DataInputAssociation specifies that the
task should not be able to distinguishwhether a predefined list
of sensitive data exists in a data object. (iii) Undetectability-
MessageFlow specifies that an adversary cannot sufficiently
distinguish true messages from false ones (e.g., random
noise).
Basedonourmeta-model inFig. 4, the following attributes
can be used to shape the exact semantic of the undetectability
annotation: The reference attribute protectDataSubjectRole
can be used to specify the roles of the involved data sub-
jects whom their sensitives data should be protected from
the detectability threats. In case an undetectability annotation
is linked to a data input association, an additional reference
attribute to the SensitiveData class called protect is applied.
This attribute allows to specify the predefined list of sensitive
data that a conclusion about their existence in the data object
in question should not be possible.
By definition [53, p. 16], undetectability is only possi-
ble against outsider adversaries. This is true only when the
target of undetectability is to protect a sensitive message or
the execution of a sensitive activity from the detectability
threat, as the work in [53] defines the undetectability on the
network level. However, in an information system, one may
be interested in preventing insiders from being able to draw
a conclusion about whether, at least, some sensitive data are
available in a specific data object or not. Thereby, in ourwork,
the considered adversary type if an undetectability annota-
tion is linked to an activity or message flow is the outsider
adversary, while if an undetectability annotation is linked to
a data input association, then insider is the considered adver-
sary.
The example model in Fig. 2 shows two undetectabil-
ity annotations. Consider, for example, the undetectability
annotation linked with the data input association between
the “Determine the beneficiary” task and the “patients need of a
transplant” data store in the “System Portal” pool. The annota-
tion specifies that the “Determine thebeneficiary” task, as insider
activity in the business process, should not be able to draw
a conclusion about whether the “age” and the “insurance type”
of the patient are stored as part of their data in the “patients
need of a transplant” data store. The annotation suggests using
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a “privacy-preserving dataminingmethod” (e.g., [44]) as amech-
anism to enforce this requirement.
Unobservability can only be applied to message flows, lead-
ing to one variant called Unobservability; the sender of the
message should be anonymous with respect to insider adver-
saries and the message itself should not be detectable by
outsider adversaries. Based on the meta-model in Fig. 4, the
following reference attributes can be used to specify the exact
semantic of the unobservability annotation; the attribute pro-
tectDataSubjectRole specifies all roles who can act as the
sender for the message. The attribute anonymizedWithin can
be used to specify the anonymity set that the involved data
subjects should be anonymous within.
The example model includes an unobservability anno-
tation linked with the message flow between the “Submit
evaluation” task and the “Receive evaluation” event. This anno-
tation specifies that outsider adversaries should not be able to
detect true messages being sent over the message flow from
false ones, and the patient who sent messages over the mes-
sage flowmust be anonymous to the insider adversary within
all patients. The annotation suggests using the “DC-networks”
[14] and the “Dummy traffic” [61] as mechanisms to enforce
this unobservability requirement.
Fairness, as shown in Fig. 5, can only be applied to activities,
leading to precisely one variant called Fairness. This variant
specifies that the activity should not discriminate between the
data subjects based on a specific list of their sensitive data,
called protected data. Based on the meta-model in Fig. 4, the
exact semantic of this annotation can be shaped by the pro-
tectDataSubjectRole, Protect, and useExplanatory reference
attributes and the type attribute, as it follows.
The reference attribute protectDataSubjectRole specifies
the set of the data subjects that may be affected by the output
of the fairness-annotated activity in terms of their roles in the
system. Depending on the business needs, in one context,
discrimination between data subjects based on their Sensi-
tiveData may not be allowed (e.g., age- and gender-based
discrimination for hiring decisions), while in another con-
text discrimination between data subjects based on the same
SensitiveData or a subset of them might be allowed (e.g.,
age-based discrimination for life insurance). Such data can
be specified in the fairness-annotated activity by using the
protect and useExplanatory attributes. The former permits
specifying the protected list of sensitive data that should not
influence the output of the fairness-annotated activity. The
latter specifies explanatory data, i.e., sensitive data whose
usage in the fairness-annotated activity can be justified in the
given context to counter discrimination.
The attribute type specifies the required fairness type
(i.e., individual- or group fairness). In some scenarios, the
output of the fairness-annotated activity should be equally
distributed between the fractions of the affected data sub-
jects with respect to their protected data (group fairness).
In other scenarios, the fairness-annotated activity must pro-
duce the same output for every two data subjects who differ
only in their protected data (individual fairness). The attribute
threshold is used for proxy discrimination.More specifically,
in addition to what is defined as protected and explanatory
data, a task may process other data that are not protected by
law but can act as proxies for protected data if there is a high
correlation between them. For example, although the address
data are not defined as protected data by the recent regula-
tions, in some countries such as the USA, the address can
act as a proxy for ethnicity due to a high correlation between
them.
Deciding when two pieces of data are correlated so that
the one acts as a proxy for the other requires a correlation
metric and a numeric threshold, which have to be determined
by domain experts. Varying metrics have been used in pre-
vious work to measure correlations [73]. For example, the
term “Pr(insurance type = Private | job = Engineer)” represents
the probability that a person is privately insured given that
the person is working as an engineer. In contrast, the term
“Entropy(insurance type = Private | job = Engineer)” measures the
uncertainty that a person is privately insured given that the
person is working as an engineer. It is noteworthy that vari-
ant correlation metrics may lead to different results, and a
domain expert has to choose the metric carefully.
The example model in Fig. 2, specifically the “System
Portal” pool at the bottom, shows one fairness annotation asso-
ciated with the “Determine the beneficiary” task. The attributes’
specifications of this annotation are shown in a yellow box
linked with the fairness annotation in the model. This anno-
tation specifies that the “Determine the beneficiary” task should
consider an equal priority for every two patients who need
an organ transplant and differ only in their “insurance type”
(i.e., public or private insurance) unless there is something
that prevents such a difference in their “ages” and/ or their
“medical histories”. For instance, a privately insured kid with
a critical medical history may receive a higher priority than
a publicly insured aged patient. Although this decision dis-
criminates against the second patient twice, as an aged and a
publicly insured patient, this may be considered legal if it can
be justified. The annotation suggests using a “discrimination-
free algorithm” (e.g., [12]) to enforce fairness and “0.5” as the
threshold for when to consider a piece of data as a proxy for
the “insurance type”.
5 Alignment checking
In this section, we propose an extension to the SecBPMN2-Q
language to allow specifying procedural security, data-
minimization and fairness requirements as graphical queries.
The queries can be automatically matched to security-, data-
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minimization-, and fairness-enriched SecBPMN2 models
in order to check the alignment between the requirements
and their specification in the models. This check helps to
avoid unwanted consequences, such as conflicts between the
specified requirements in the BPMN models. For example,
consider the following two requirements from the healthcare
management scenario:
– Req1: A telemedicine device should execute the “Send
data to portal” task anonymously by using pseudonyms.
– Req2: A telemedicine device should be accountable
when it performs the “Send data to portal” task.
If a business analyst unintentionally uses the anonymity
level full anonymous instead of pseudonymous for specify-
ing Req1 in Fig. 2, a conflict with Req2 will arise since a
telemedicine device with the ability to execute the “Send data
to portal” task full anonymously cannot be accountable as
required by Req2. Conflicts resulting from non-alignments
between the provided requirements and the enriched BPMN
models, if not avoided early, can make the process of locat-
ing conflict root causes in later development stages difficult.
To avoid these conflicts, the alignment between the require-
ments specifications and the enriched BPMNmodels should
be ensured, a tedious and error-prone task for smaller models
and an infeasible onewithmodelswith hundreds of elements.
To overcome this challenge, we present an automated align-
ment checking technique that takes as input: (i) an enriched
SecBPMN2 model with security, data-minimization, and fair-
ness annotations, and (ii) a set of security, data-minimization,
and fairness requirements specified as SecBPMN2-Q pat-
terns. The SecBPMN2-Q patterns can then be automatically
matched to the annotated SecBPMN2 model to discover any
mis-alignments.
Modeling SecBPMN2-Q patterns SecBPMN2-Q supports
custom queries enriched with security requirements that
can be matched to SecBPMN2 models [67] for align-
ment checking. We extended SecBPMN2-Q so that it sup-
ports our data-minimization and fairness annotations as
well, allowing involved requirements engineers to formu-
late fairness, data-minimization, and security requirements
as patterns that can be matched to a given SecBPMN2
model.
Based on the provided requirements, itmight be preferable
to: first, encode two or more requirements into one pattern
to model situations where two or more different require-
ments support each other. Second, encode a requirement
or a set of requirements as domain-specific SecBPMN2-
Q patterns that can be reused in future projects within the
same domain. Examples of these two ways of encoding
requirements into SecBPMN2-Q patterns are captured in
Fig. 6.
Fig. 6 Requirements specified as SecBPMN2-Q patterns
Pattern P1 in Fig. 6 specifies that the business process
model should have a fairness-annotated task called “Deter-
mine thebeneficiary”, regardless of its executor. This is because
the “Determine the beneficiary” in pattern P1 is not part of a spe-
cific pool or swimlane, which are usually used to illustrate
that participants in the process [7]. Listing 1 shows how the
properties of the fairness annotation in this pattern are spec-
ified. For alignment checking, our query engine considers
annotations and their properties as part of the pattern to be
matched to the BPMN model in question.
A common practice is to reuse procedural processes from
already existing business process models when designing a
business process model for a new business project within
the same domain. The main reason is the shared business
needs between stakeholders of different projects or applica-
tionswithin the same domain [23]. For example, in Fig. 2, the
procedural process that starts by “Fill donation form” task and
ends by “Determine the beneficiary” task can be reused in the
business processmodels of future clinical projects. The reuse
is not restricted only to the procedural description of business
processes. If a business process procedure is associated with
data protection requirements, the procedure description, and
its associated data protection requirements, can be consid-
ered together when the business process procedure is reused.
This is because, within the same domain, the data protection
requirements are mainly derived from the same laws and
regulations. Therefore, if the procedural part that describe
how the organ transplant is managed in our example model,
in Fig. 2, is reused in a new BPMN model, a requirement
engineer can reuse pattern P1 to ensure that the fairness spec-
ifications on the “Determine the beneficiary” task are correctly
specified as in pattern P1.
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Considering pattern P2 in Fig. 6, a label of the form “@”
followed by a string acts as a placeholder for element names.
This allows assigning any element of the same type when
the pattern is matched to the input model. The walk relation
(illustrated using an edge with double arrowhead), which
can be defined for pairs of activities, events or gateways,
allows matching all pairs of elements in the input model
for which there is a control dependency path between the
source and the target element. Therefore, pattern P2 in Fig. 6
specifies that regardless who are the two participants in the
considered process, the “Fill evaluation form” task has to be
anonymity-annotated and the first message flow that allows
transmittingmessages between the two participants, after the
“Fill evaluation form” task is reached, has to be unobservability-
annotated. List. 2 and List. 3 show how the properties of the
anonymity and the unobservability annotations are specified
in pattern P2, respectively.
The reason for specifying the anonymity and the unob-
servability requirements together in pattern P2 is that a full
anonymous accessing for the “Fill evaluation form” task by
a participant against insiders (i.e., other participants in the
process) can be violated, if there is a control dependency
path between the “Fill evaluation form” task and another task
that sends messages to other participants without supporting
unobservability or at least full anonymity against insiders
during the transmission of the messages. More precisely,
without unobservability, themessage recipient will be able to
trace the messages back to its original sender and, as a result,
indirectly violates her anonymity. Also outsider adversaries
will be able to detect that there is a communication between
the participants in the process. Since this violation can arise
regardless of who the involved participants in the process
are and what task sends messages between them, the Pool
BPMN elements in pattern P2 and the task sending messages
between them are labeled with the “@” wildcard to specific
a reusable domain-specific pattern.
Automated alignment checking Once the data protection
patterns to be checked in the SecBPMN2 model are iden-
tified, the business analyst can have the check performed
automatically, by using our extension of the SecBPMN2
query engine. For example, a match for both patterns P1 and
P2 in Fig. 6, together with the specifications of their prop-
erties, can be found in the SecBMPMN2 model in Fig. 2.
More precisely, with respect to pattern P1, the SecBPMN2
model has a fairness-annotated “Determine thebeneficiary” task
and the specifications of the fairness annotation are similar to
those for pattern P1. For pattern P2, the SecBPMN2 model
has an anonymity-annotated “Fill evaluation form” task that has
a control dependency with a task that sends messages over
an unobservability-annotated message flow to another par-
ticipant. The specifications of both annotations in the model
are also matched to their specifications in pattern P2.
In the case of mismatched patterns, our query engine
reports textual messages that describe the mismatches. The
involved stakeholders can then fix the SecBPMN2 model so
that it matches the reported mismatched patterns, or relax the
mismatched patterns so that they match the model. This pro-
cess should be repeated until all the considered patterns are
matched to the model. By checking the alignment between
the requirements and their specifications in the business pro-
cess models, conflicts that may result from non-alignment
can be avoided. Consequently, the results of the actual con-
flict detection (Sect. 6) are easier to interpret by users.
However, performing the alignment check can have broader
positive implications for the overall development process. At
its heart, it serves to detect inconsistencies between require-
ments and design artifacts, and therefore may help to avoid
costly fixes later in the development process arising from
these inconsistencies.
6 Conflict detection
We propose an automated conflict detection technique that
relies on encoded knowledge about conflicts and potential
conflicts between pairs of requirements. Specifically, we pro-
pose a catalog of conflict SecBPMN2-Q anti-patterns which
can be matched against business process models in order
to detect conflicts and potential conflicts. Conflicts repre-
sent definitive trade-offs between the requirements, while the
potential conflicts may result in conflicts under certain cir-
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cumstances. Consequently, our tool shows conflicts as errors
and potential conflicts as warnings to the user.
6.1 Automated conflict detection using
anti-patterns
The reason for choosing SecBPMN2-Q for automating the
conflict detection process is its expressiveness for encoding
conflict anti-patterns. Specifically, SecBPMN2-Q has a rela-
tion called walk which, as mentioned earlier, allows to match
all business processes in which there is a control dependency
path between its source and the target elements. This property
allowed us to capture conflicts that may arise due to a control
dependencypath betweendifferent requirements for different
inter-dependent BPMN elements in the input business pro-
cess model. In total, we designed 143 domain-independent
anti-patterns, which we combined into one catalog. The anti-
patterns in our catalog can be classified into four categories,
as follows:
(A) Conflicts betweendata-minimization and security require-
ments (47 anti-patterns).
(B) Potential conflicts between data-minimization and secu-
rity requirements (93 anti-patterns).
(C) Conflicts betweendata-minimization and fairness require-
ments (two constrained anti-patterns).
(D) Potential conflicts between data-minimization and fair-
ness requirements (one constrained anti-patterns).
If an anti-pattern has a match in the business process
model, a conflict or potential conflict is reported. A con-
strained anti-pattern has an additional constraint that must
be satisfied so that a conflict or potential conflict arises.
Our patterns are not designed to take into account spe-
cific data protection mechanisms for implementing the given
requirements, as can be specified using the enforcedBy
attribute. While this information may be helpful to identify
whether two requirements are conflicting or not, addressing
the available data protection mechanisms is not a feasible
because: (i) the number of the available data protectionmech-
anisms grows continuously [75], and (ii) the knowledge of
security engineers on how to design and the knowledge of
adversities on how to break data protection mechanisms
grows continuously aswell [11]. Amechanism that today has
the ability to preserve a specific data protection requirement
might be broken tomorrow. Consequently, our anti-pattern
catalog would be outdated very soon if it addressed this
knowledge. Therefore, our patterns generally do not use the
enforcedBy attribute. To still raise awareness on possible con-
flicts, wemodel situationswhere the decision onwhether two
requirements are in conflict depends on the applied mecha-
nisms, as potential conflicts.
In the following, we discuss how our approach can be used
to detect conflicts and potential conflicts between security,
data-minimization, and fairness requirements by using exam-
ples from the four categories of our catalog of anti-patterns.
The selected examples do not cover all the (potential) con-
flicts that can happen between the data-protection concepts in
our catalog. An overview of our catalog is given in Sect. 6.2,
while a more detailed account is provided in “Appendix B”.
(A) Conflicts between data-minimization and security
requirements Conflicts between data-minimization and
security requirements occur in twoflavors: first, requirements
related to the same asset in the system may be conflict-
ing. For example, consider the accountability and anonymity
annotations linked with the “Send data to portal” task in the
“Tele-medicine Device” pool at the left-hand side of Fig. 2. For
accountability, the system needs to track the executor of this
task’s responsibility, while the anonymity annotation spec-
ifies that the executor should be fully anonymous against
insider adversaries.
Second, requirements related to different, dependent
assets may be conflicting. For example, in Fig. 2 at the
right-hand side, consider the anonymity and non-repudiation
annotations linked with the “Fill evaluation form” task and the
“Evaluation form” data object, respectively. The former, as
shown in Fig. 5, imposes that an executor to the “Fill evalu-
ation form” task should be fully anonymous against insider
adversaries; the latter, as shown in Fig. 3, indicates that an
accessor to the “Evaluation form” data object should not be able
to deny that she accessed the “Evaluation form”. Since the “Fill
evaluation form” task writes data to the “Evaluation form” data
object, a conflict is reported. In Fig. 7, we show a selection
of anti-patterns defined using our SecBPMN2-Q extension.
Together, the depicted anti-patterns represent all conflicts
that can happen between anonymity and non-repudiation. All
anonymity annotations in Fig. 7 are specified with the fol-
lowing attributes: {level = full anonymous, insider = true}.
Consider, for example, conflictsC1 andC5 inFig. 7. These
conflicts arise when non-repudiation and anonymity annota-
tions are linked to the same task ormessageflow, respectively.
C1 can be matched to one place in the example model in
Fig. 2: in the “Patient” pool at the right-hand side of themodel,
the anonymity annotation of the “Fill evaluation form” task is
propagated to the “Submit evaluation” task, which is annotated
with a non-repudiation annotation.
In contrast, C5 does not occur in the example model, since
the model does not have an anonymity- and non-repudiation-
annotated message flow. C2, C3 and C4 come in two variants
since the data object call (read or write) can be inverted, and
the assignment of requirements to elements can be swapped.
C2 can bematched to two places in the examplemodel, as fol-
lows: first, in the “Patient” pool, the anonymity-annotated “Fill
evaluation form” task is writing a data to the “Evaluation form”
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Fig. 7 Conflicts C1–C5
between non-repudiation and
anonymity as anti-patterns
Fig. 8 Potential conflicts
between non-repudiation and
anonymity as anti-patterns
data object, which is annotated with a non-repudiation anno-
tation. Second, in the “Patient” pool, the “Submit evaluation”
task is annotated with anonymity (due to the propagation of
the anonymity annotation that is linkedwith the “Fill evaluation
form” task) and it is reading data from the non-repudiation-
annotated “Evaluation form” data object. C3 can be matched to
one place in the examplemodel, as follows: the “Submit evalua-
tion” task in the “Patient” pool is annotatedwith anonymity and
it is sending messages over the non-repudiation-annotated
message flow between the “Patient” and the “Emergency Unit”
pools. In contrast, C4 does not occur in the example model,
since the model does not have a task that reads or writes
data to/from a non-repudiation-annotated data object and at
the same time sends messages over an anonymity-annotated
message flow.
(B) Potential conflicts between data-minimization and
security requirements Potential conflicts between security
and data-minimization requirements as considered in our
work result from control dependencies between activities
with specified requirements. For example, Fig. 2 includes
a control dependency path between the anonymity-annotated
“Fill evaluation form” task and the non-repudiation-annotated
“Submit evaluation” task. Such situations not necessarily give
rise to an actual conflict. For instance, imagine aflowbetween
two tasks where the first task allows a customer to anony-
mously use a service and the second task allows the service
provider to prevent a customer from being able to deny his
payment for receiving a service. In this situation, it may be
sufficient for a service provider to prove that a customer per-
formed the payment task without uncovering which service
a customer is paying for, and as a consequence, preserve
the customer anonymity. Such potential conflicts should be
reported and discussed during the design of the business pro-
cess models.
In Fig. 8, we show three anti-patterns specifying potential
conflicts between anonymity and non-repudiation. In these
patterns, we use awalk relation tomatch all pairs of elements
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in the input model for which there is a control dependency
path between the source and the target element. Note, in
Fig. 8, only three out of eight overall potential conflicts for the
considered pair of requirements are shown. Two additional
cases called PC3 and PC5 are formed in analogy toC3 andC5
in Fig. 7; three additional variants arise from duality like in
the discussion of the conflicts. Again, all anonymity annota-
tions are specified with: {anonymity level = full anonymous,
insider = true}.
The potential conflict PC1 in Fig. 8 illustrates the situation
where a potential conflict can arise due to the existence of
a control dependency path between an anonymity-annotated
task and a non-repudiation-annotated task. PC2 represents
the situation where a potential conflict can arise due to a
control dependency path between a task that reads or writes
data from/to a non-repudiation-annotated data object and
an anonymity-annotated task. While PC4 specifies a path
between an anonymity-annotated task and another task that
sends messages over a non-repudiation-annotated message
flow, all these situations may lead to conflict, depending on
the actual circumstances in the system.
Using PC1, PC2, and PC4 of Fig. 8 with the example
model in Fig. 2, four warnings will be reported, due to the
following reasons: (i) there is a control dependency path
between the anonymity-annotated “Fill evaluation form” task
and the non-repudiation-annotated “Submit evaluation” task,
thus violating PC1. (ii) PC2 is violated twice: first, there is a
control path between the anonymity-annotated “Submit evalua-
tion” task and the “Fill evaluation form” task,whichwrites data to
the non-repudiation-annotated data object. Second, there is a
control dependency path between the “Submit evaluation” task,
which reads data from the non-repudiation-annotated data
object, and the anonymity-annotated “Fill evaluation form” task.
(iii) there is a control path between the anonymity-annotated
“Fill evaluation form” task and the “Submit evaluation” task which
sends messages over a non-repudiation-annotated message
flow, leading to a violation of PC4.
(C) Conflicts between data-minimization and fairness
requirements From considering all possible combinations
of requirements, we identified two critical situations that can
lead to conflicts. We captured these situations as constrained
conflict anti-patterns (shown in Fig. 9a). If the constrained
conflict anti-patterns CC1 and CC2 are matched in the input,
BPMN model conflicts are only reported if a correspond-
ing constraint (described below) is satisfied. The constraints
check how some relevant attributes of the annotations in the
BPMN model are related.
The undetectability annotation in the constrained conflict
CC1 is specified with the attribute {insider=true}. The fair-
ness annotations in both constrained conflicts CC1 and CC2
are not further specified. This means these anti-patterns can
be matched to the input model irrespective of the attributes’
values of its fairness annotations.
The constrained conflict CC1 specifies the situationwhere
a fairness-annotated task reads undetectability-constrained
data from a data object. Generally, to preserve fairness, the
fairness-annotated task in themodel should have access to the
data defined by the protect and the useExplanatory attributes
of the fairness annotation. These two attributes, as explained
in Sect. 4, define the protected data that the output of the
fairness-annotated activity should be fair with respect to, and
the data that, from the perspective of the domain experts, is
legitimate to use as input to the fairness-annotated task. If
group fairness is required, the task needs to access what is
defined as protected data in the fairness annotation to ensure
equal distribution for its outputs between the protected group
fractions. In the case of individual fairness, the task needs
to access what is defined as protected to find out which of
its inputs may act as a proxy for protected data [3]. This is
important to avoid influencing the outputs of an individual
fairness-annotated task by protected data.
With respect to the explanatory data, a fairness-annotated
task needs to access what is defined as explanatory data by
the fairness annotation to achieve business needs, regardless
of the required type of fairness. Therefore, if CC1 is matched
in a business process model and the matched undetectabil-
ity annotation in the model requires undetectability for data
specified as protect or explanatory data by the fairness anno-
tations in the model, a conflict should be reported. This is
because it is impossible to have the same data undetectable
and using it as input to fulfill the fairness requirement in the
context described by the constrained conflict CC1.
The graphical pattern for CC1 alone is not sufficient to
implement this intuition, since it does not check whether
the undetectability and fairness annotations refer to the same
data, thus inducing a conflict. Therefore, in addition tomatch-
ing the anti-pattern, our query engine evaluates an additional
constraint on how the relevant attributes are specified in the
model. Given a SecBPMN2 model m and a match of CC1 to
a part of m that includes the fairness annotation f air and the
undetectability annotation undetect , a conflict is reported if:
(
f air .get Protected( ) ∪ f air .get Explanatory( ))
⋂
undetect .get Protected( ) = ∅
The f air .get Explanatory( ) and f air .get Protected( )
retrieve the set of data defined by f air as explanatory
and protected data, respectively, while und.get Protected( )
retrieves the set of data specified as protected by undetect .
Matching the anti-pattern CC1 to the example model in
Fig. 2 yields one conflict to be reported. There is a match
for CC1, as the “System Portal” pool has an undetectability-
annotated data input association between the “Patient in need
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Fig. 9 Conflicts and potential conflicts between fairness, undetectability, and anonymity as constrained anti-patterns
of a transplant” data store (represented as a data object) and the
fairness-annotated “Determine the beneficiary” task. The con-
straint is fulfilled since there is an intersection between the
data that should be undetectable when the task reads data
from the data store and the data that are defined as protected
and explanatory in the fairness annotation.More specifically,
the “insurance type” and the “age” data which are, respec-
tively, defined as part of the protect and the useExplanatory
attributes of the fairness annotation, are also required to be
undetectable, as specified by the protect attribute of the unde-
tectability annotation.
The constrained conflict CC2 in Fig. 9 describes the
critical situation where a fairness-annotated task is control-
dependent on another fairness-annotated task, in the sense
that the one task is only reached under some condition (here
expressed by gateway “@Z”) that depends on the output of
the other task. Irrespective of the required fairness type of
each fairness annotation, this situation may lead to a con-
flict if the explanatory data set that is defined by the fairness
annotations of the first task intersects with the protected data
set that is defined by the fairness annotation of the second
task.
For example, let “identify insurance tariff” and “identify reim-
bursement factor” be two decision-making activities in a
private health insurance company. The first activity aims to
decide about the insurance tariff that a customer should have,
while the second activity aims to decide about the reim-
bursement factor that the insurance company can offer for
a customer. In this company, depending on the output of
the “identify insurance tariff” decision-making activity, the cus-
tomer’s reimbursement factor will be either the output of
executing the “identify reimbursement factor” decision-making
activity or afixedvalue that canbe retrieved fromapredefined
list of reimbursement factors. Irrespective the type of fairness
(i.e., group- or individual fairness) that each decision-making
activity aims to provide, assume the following: first, the gen-
der is defined as explanatory data for the “identify insurance
tariff” activity, as it might be legally authorized to use the gen-
der for identifying the insurance tariffs of customers. Second,
the gender is defined as protected data for the “identify reim-
bursement factor” activity, as it might be not allowed to use
gender for deciding about the reimbursement factor.
Since “identify insurance tariff” discriminates on gender to
identify the insurance tariff and since the decision of whether
to execute “identify reimbursement factor” or not depends on the
insurance tariff, neither individual fairness nor group fairness
can be achieved. More specifically, based on the insurance
tariff which can act as a proxy for gender: first, two cus-
tomers who differ only in their gender will receive different
reimbursement factors. This is because one customer will
receive the reimbursement factor as an output for executing
the “identify reimbursement factor” activity, while the second
customer will receive it as a retrieved value from a prede-
fined list of reimbursement factors, which does not guarantee
equal reimbursement factors and, as a consequence, violat-
ing individual fairness with respect to gender. Second, since
males customers will receive insurance tariffs different than
females, not all of themwill receive their reimbursement fac-
tors as outputs for “identify the reimbursement factor”. Hence,
the reimbursement factors will not be equally distributed
between the fractions of males and females, which is a vio-
lation of group fairness with respect to gender.
The necessary agreement between the attributes is cap-
tured in the following constraint. Given a SecBPMN2 model
m and amatch of CC2 to a part ofm that includes the fairness
annotations f air1 and f air2 for the tasks to which “@X”
and “@Y” are mapped, respectively, a conflict is reported
if:
f air1.get Explanatory() ∩ f air2.get Protected() = ∅
The f air1.get Explanatory( ) and f air2.get Protected
( ) retrieve the set of data that are defined as explanatory and
protected data, respectively.
From matching the constrained conflict CC2 to the exam-
ple model in Fig. 2, no conflicts are reported, since CC2 has
no matches in the example model.
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(D) Potential conflicts between data-minimization and
fairness requirements Our catalog of conflict anti-patterns
contains one constrained anti-pattern that if matched in the
input model and if its corresponding constraint is satisfied,
detects a potential conflict. Figure 9 shows the constrained
potential conflict CPC1. The anonymity annotation in CPC1
is specified with the following attribute: {insider=true}. For
the fairness annotation, no attribute values are specified.
CPC1 specifies the critical situation where a fairness-
annotated task reads anonymized data from a data object.
This situation, if matched in the input model, may lead to a
potential conflict if the set of data specified by the protect
and the useExplanatory attributes of the fairness annotation
intersects with the data to be anonymized when the fairness-
annotated task reads data from the data object. A decision
on whether this situation represents a conflict or not depends
on the applied anonymization technique. In some situations,
providing anonymized data to a fairness-annotated task may
not prevent it from being able to [28]: (i) detect proxies for
protected data in the case of individual fairness is required
or (ii) produce equally distributed outputs fractions between
protected groups in the case of group fairness is required.
A potential conflict between a fairness and an anonymity
requirement arises if the following constraint is fulfilled.
Given a SecBPMN model m and a match of CPC1 to a
part of m that includes the fairness annotation f air and the
anonymity annotation ann, a conflict is reported if:
(
f air .get Protected( ) ∪ f air .get Explanatory( ))
⋂
anon.get Protected( ) = ∅
The anon.get Protected( ) retrieves the set of data that
are specified as protected by the matched anonymity anno-
tation in m, while f air .get Explanatory( ) and f air .get
Protected( ) retrieve the data that are defined by thematched
fairness annotation in m as explanatory and protected data,
respectively.
Frommatching the constrained potential conflict CPC1 to
the example model in Fig. 2, no conflicts are identified, as
the anti-pattern has no matches in the example model.
6.2 Catalog of a domain-independent conflicts
As mentioned in Sect. 2, SecBPMN2 supports ten different
security requirements. Similar to our annotations, the same
security annotations can be linked to different BPMN ele-
ments.Weanalyzed the situationswhere conflicts or potential
conflicts between two data protection annotations, i.e., secu-
rity, data-minimization, or fairness annotations, may happen.
For each identified situation, we specified an anti-pattern
using our extension of SecBPMN2-Q. To assure the cor-
rectness and completeness of our technique, each possible
combination of requirements and their resulting conflicts
were discussed by at least two authors. In the absence of a
more formal validation for the correctness and completeness
of our technique, a manual check complementing our auto-
mated onemay be desirable; still we argue that our automated
check can support developers in effectively discovering con-
flicts in the system (see Sect. 9).
Together our anti-patterns represent a basic catalog for
finding conflicts that can be extended by advanced users, thus
improving the confidence in the overall approach. We now
give an overview of the resulting catalog of anti-patterns. A
more detailed account is provided in “Appendix B”. Table 1
shows all pairs of requirements for which we identified a
(potential) conflict. Each cell shows the number of con-
flicts, plus the number of potential conflicts between the
considered pair of requirements. For example, there are eight
conflicts and eight potential conflicts for non-repudiation
and anonymity. The origin of these numbers is explained
in the previous descriptions of Figs. 7 and 8. The other
numbers arise from the various possibilities of linking a
data-minimization or a security annotation with other BPMN
elements. In total, our catalog contains 143 anti-patterns.
Considering conflicts and potential conflicts,Accountabil-
ity, Authenticity, Audibility, and Non-delegation represent
different requirements to keep insider users accountable for
their actions. To preserve them, the identity of an action’s
executor must be verified. Therefore, similarly to Non-
repudiation, all of these security concepts may have conflicts
or potential conflicts withAnonymity (where required against
insiders) and Unobservability, since part of its definition
implies full anonymity against insiders.
While the Separation and Binding of duties can con-
flict with Anonymity if any of the activities to which they
are applied also require to be executed anonymously. For
instance, it will be hard, in case ofBinding of Duties, to prove
that two fully anonymously executed activities are executed
by the same person or not. A potential conflict between the
Binding of duties andUnlinkability is also possible:Unlinka-
bility is linked to two pools and indicates that the two process
executions should not be linked to each other as related.
Therefore, it may conflict with Binding of Duty.
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability represent dif-
ferent requirements to allow authorized users to read,modify,
or access a system asset, respectively. The satisfaction of
these requirements relies on authorization, which, however,
does not necessarily imply identification: The literature pro-
vides many techniques for performing authorization without
uncovering the real identity of an action executor, for exam-
ple, zero-knowledge protocols [46]. However, the system
developers may choose to implement these requirements by
a mechanism that relies on identification, such as access con-
trol, which may lead to conflicts with data-minimization
requirements. Hence, a decision about whether a conflict
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Anonymity 2+2 6+6 8+8 8+8 2+2 1+0 1+0 4+5 0+8 0+11 0+11 0+0 0+1*
Unlinkability 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+1 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+0
Unobservability 1+1 3+3 4+4 4+4 1+1 0+0 0+0 2+2 0+4 0+6 0+6 0+0 0+0
Fairness 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+0 0+1* 0+0 0+0 0+0 1+0 1+0
arises cannot be made on the abstraction level of process
models. Therefore, as shown in Table 1, we classified the
interactions between these security requirements and the
data-minimization requirements as potential conflicts.
In some cases, Confidentiality and Integrity are consid-
ered as supplementing requirements to Anonymity [30]. For
instance, anonymity against outsider adversaries implies that
the outsider adversaries should not be able to trace a message
back to its sender. However, if the sent message contains
personal identifiable information and it is sent in clear (i.e.,
without encryption), an outsider attacker can easily link the
messages to its sender. These kinds of interactions cannot be
considered as conflicts or potential conflicts, and thus, they
are omitted from Table 1.
Conversely, conflicts may not only occur between differ-
ent categories of requirements (e.g., security requirements
vs. data-minimization requirements). Table 1 indicates that a
particular Anonymity annotation might conflict with other
Anonymity or Unobservability annotations. For example,
requiring full anonymous access for an activity against insid-
ers is in conflict with requiring the output of the same task to
be sent anonymously using the pseudonyms of the accessors
for the task.
Since the security concepts that are considered in this
paper aim either to monitor the insiders’ activities (e.g.,Non-
Repudiation) or to prevent malicious access to assets that
store or process data (e.g., Confidentiality), they cannot have
conflicts with Fairness. This is because Fairness is not about
preventing access to data but it is about controlling the use
for the data when access to them is provided. For this, during
our analysis for all the possible situations where a security
or a fairness annotation can interact with each other, we did
not detect a situation that may lead to a conflict or a potential
conflict between fairness and all other security concepts.
In specific situations, a Fairness requirement can have
conflicts with other fairness requirement or (potential) con-
flicts with data-minimization requirements. As shown in
Table 1, Fairness can have conflicts with Undetectability or
another Fairness requirement, and potential conflicts with
Anonymity. The anti-patterns of these conflicts and potential
conflicts are shown in Fig. 9 and discussed in the previous
section. The two intersections in Table 1 with a (*) symbol
represent the same potential conflict between fairness and
anonymity.
Different from all other anti-patterns in our catalog, the
three anti-patterns in Fig. 9 are constrained anti-patterns,
meaning that a match of any of them in the input model
is insufficient to report a conflict. In addition, an associated
constraint has to be checked in order to detect a conflict, as
explained in detail in Sect. 6.1.
7 Tool support
We developed a prototypical implementation of our work on
top of STS tool [63], the supporting tool for SecBPMN2 [67].
STS tool is a security requirement software tool that
allows creating diagrams using SecBPMN2 language, and
it supports automated analyses and enforcement of secu-
rity constraints.1 Our implementation supports the con-
tributions of this work: first, modeling of security, data-
minimization, and fairness requirements in BPMN models,
using a suitable model editor; second, modeling of secu-
rity, data-minimization, and fairness requirements as patterns
and anti-patterns; third, automatic alignment verification
between data protection requirements specified as patterns
and their specifications in the annotated BPMN models;
fourth, automatic conflict detection between data protec-
tion requirements in annotated BPMN models with data
protection requirements, based on our catalog of domain-
independent anti-patterns.
The examples shown in Figs. 2 and 6, 7, 8, 9 come from
screenshots of our implementation. Our alignment check-
ing and conflict detection approaches require as an input a
BPMNmodel with security, data-minimization, and fairness
annotations. The output of the alignment verification is a set
of textual messages that describe the detected non-aligned
requirements with their specifications in the model. The out-
1 http://www.sts-tool.eu.
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Shows “Error” if the matched anti-pattern represents 
a conflict and “Warning” if the matched anti-pattern 
represents a potential conflict. A description of the matched anti-pattern The name of the matched anti-pattern
Fig. 10 Analysis results view from our tool
put of the conflict detection is a set of textual messages that
describe the detected conflicts. Figure 10 shows a dedicated
view from our tool, listing the messages. On demand, a non-
aligned requirement or a conflict can be highlighted in the
model. For example, the red-highlighted path in Fig. 2 is the
result of selecting the conflict message that describes the PC1
anti-pattern in Fig. 8. Our implementation is available online
at http://www.sts-tool.eu/downloads/secbpmn-dm. Support
for the constrained anti-patterns in Fig. 9 is not yet imple-
mented in the current version of our tool and it is part of
future work.
8 Case study
To study the feasibility of our approach, we applied it in a
healthcare scenario. We extended a teleconsultations health-
care management case study from the Ospedale Pediatrico
Bambino Gesù, a pediatric Italian hospital. The case study
was part of the VisiOn research project [74]. The main objec-
tive of VisiOn consisted of increasing the citizens’ awareness
on privacy. The final outcome of the project was a platform
that can be used by public administrations and companies to
design their systems, using privacy as a first-class require-
ment. The teleconsultations case study described a situation
where a patient EHR can be transferred from the OPBG sys-
tem to specialists in another hospital for a teleconsultations
purposes. In this scenario, many security requirements are
considered (e.g., confidentiality, accountability) but the pri-
vacy preferences were more related to data anonymization.
In this paper, we extended this scenario to cover situations
where data minimization and fairness play an important role
in protecting the users’ data. To this end, we modeled a pro-
cess featuring an over-distance healthcare service, an excerpt
being shown in Fig. 2. Using our approach, as explained in
Sect. 4, wewere able to enrich themodel with dataminimiza-
tion and fairness requirements that represent data-protection
preferences for patients.
For conflict detection, we annotated the model with secu-
rity requirements that represent security needs from the
system point of view. Assessing the accuracy of conflict
detection based on this model required a ground truth. To
this end, we manually analyzed the model and identified
nine conflicts and 21 potential conflicts, a subset being dis-
cussed in Sect. 6. Applied to themodel, our conflict detection
technique precisely detected eight out of the nine manu-
ally detected conflicts. This is because one of the manually
detected conflicts can be detected with a constrained anti-
pattern which is not yet implemented at the tool level. Our
tool detects 21 potential conflicts as expected. The model
with all security, data-minimization, and fairness require-
ments is publicly available at https://github.com/QRamadan/
SoSyM-conflictsDetection.
9 User experiment
We further aimed to study the practical usefulness of our
technique for conflict detection between security, data-
minimization, and fairness requirements. We focused on two
main goals: First, to study if our initial assumption that the
manual detection of conflicts is error-prone can be confirmed.
Second, to study if users find the output of our technique
helpful for supporting the conflict detection. Based on these
goals, we derived the following research questions.
– RQ1: How error-prone is conflict detection when per-
formed manually?
– RQ2: How helpful do users find the output of our auto-
mated conflict detection?
We studied RQ1 and RQ2 in a user experiment with 30 new
participants, a significantly larger sample than in our earlier
preliminary study, which was based on seven participants
[59] and did not address RQ1, as it was based on a subject
assessment only.
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Table 2 Experience levels of participants
Mean Median SD
BPMN 2.55 2 1.27
Security 3.14 3 1.06
Privacy 2.97 3 0.99
9.1 Set-up
Our overall sample consists of 30 participants, specifically,
18 master students, one bachelor student, eight researchers,
and two practitioners. Thus, we relied primarily on students
as participants. We justify this choice with earlier research
findings, according to which students perform nearly equally
well when faced with a software development approach, and
are therefore suitable as stand-ins for practitioners [66]. As a
baseline, our technique assumes the user to be familiar with
BPMN. Therefore, the students were recruited from a course
in which BPMN was introduced and students completed
relevant assignments 2weeks before the experiment. BPMN-
experienced researchers and practitioners were recruited
based on the personal network of the authors (convenience
sampling). We also asked all participants to self-asses their
expertise in the relevant background fields BPMN, security,
and privacy on a 5-point Likert scale. For each background
field, Table 2 reports the mean and average, response values
and the standard deviation. With expertise levels of 2.55/5
for BPMN, 3.14/5 for security, and 2.97/5 in privacy (means
of response values), this distribution approximates the back-
ground of the intended user group, characterized by relevant
knowledge, but an absence of expert knowledge in business
process modeling, security, and privacy.
We presented the participants with a questionnaire and an
auxiliary “cheatsheet” with explanations and specifications
of our notations. The questionnaire consisted of three tasks in
total. Tasks 1 and 2 were warm-up tasks for making the par-
ticipants familiar with the data protection annotations from
our approach. Task 3, elaborated below, focused on conflict
detection. The tasks were based on the running example of
this paper as introduced in Sect. 4. We showed excerpts from
the contained BPMNmodel and security, data-minimization,
and fairness requirements. Depending on the availability of a
laptop, participants filled out the questionnaire on their com-
puters or on a paper printout.
Task 3 and Task 4 represent the experimental tasks. We
used a variant of thewithin-subject experimental design [13],
in which all participants act as their own control. Every par-
ticipant was exposed to two treatments, conflict detection
without tool support (RQ1) and with tool support (RQ2). In
task 3, we studied RQ1 by having the participants manually
identify conflicts and potential conflicts as detected by our
technique. To this end, we showed them an annotated BPMN
model with annotations of various types and asked them to
identify conflicts and potential conflicts. As a first question,
we asked them to identify conflicts manually and, in the pos-
itive case, write down the conflict. As a second question, we
presented them with a list of types of potential conflicts and
asked them in a multiple choice question which type actu-
ally occurs.Afterward, to studyRQ2,wepresented themwith
the output of our technique when applied to the examples.
Specifically, we showed them screenshots of the user inter-
face of our tool. Sources of conflicts are highlighted in the
diagram, and a textual explanation of the identified conflict
is given. We asked the participants to rate the helpfulness
of this presentation on a 5-point Likert scale, 1 indicating
“not helpful” and 5 indicating “very helpful.” We also asked
them for free-form feedback regarding the overall technique.
We provide all experimental materials and raw data online at
https://github.com/QRamadan/SoSyM-conflictsDetection.
9.2 Results
Regarding RQ1, Fig. 11 shows the results of the task regard-
ing manual conflict detection. Only a minority of 17% and
34% of all participants gave the correct answer in the con-
flict and potential conflict cases, respectively. 72% and 28%
of all participants, respectively, gave an incorrect answer in
the conflict and potential conflict cases: they stated that the
model does not contain any conflicts, or selected the wrong
conflicts types. A portion of 10% or 38% chose not to answer
the question, indicating a varying difficulty level between
both questions. The weak performance of our participants in
identifying conflicts manually confirms our initial assump-
tion that this is an error-prone task.
Regarding RQ2, Fig. 12 shows the results of the subjec-
tive assessment of the helpfulness of our conflict detection
output. Overall, in both cases, we found a positive sentiment.
Majorities of 54% and 68% gave a helpfulness score above
the medium of the scale. A score of 5 was chosen by 39%
in the conflict case and 25% in the potential conflict case. A
score of 4was chosen by 29% in both cases. Scores below the
mediumwere in a clearminority, 3.5%each for a score of 1 or
2 for conflicts and potential conflicts. The positive tendency
is in line with the comments we received in the free-form
feedback, such as: “I liked the implementation of detecting
the conflicts in figure E” and “The notation is really help-
ful. In my opinion, it can facilitate the process of designing
critical systems with sensitive information.”
We also analyzed the written free-form feedback for neg-
ative comments which may explain the comparatively large
share of mid-ranged answers (39% for potential conflicts
and 25% for conflicts, respectively). While we did not find
any related comments on specific aspects of the output,
one participant pointed out the need for careful instruc-
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Fig. 11 Results for RQ1:
Error-proneness of manual
conflict detection
Fig. 12 Results for RQ2:
Perceived helpfulness of
automated conflict detection
tions: “It is very hard to give meaningful feedback without
a clear explanation of the proposes notation and the respec-
tive semantics.” We do not find that this comment is in line
with the feedback from the majority of our participants, who
did not comment negatively on the provided “cheatsheet”
and its descriptions of the annotations. Provided with the
cheatsheet, a third of all participants were able to specify
correct answers during manual conflict detection, indicating
its general understandability. Still, we view this comment as
significant, as it emphasizes the need for adequate training
when applying our technique in real-life scenarios.
The twomain observations from our study can be summa-
rized as follows. First, our technique supports the detection
of errors that are hard to identify manually (RQ1). Second,
users generally perceive the output of our technique as help-
ful (RQ2). Our experimental design is subject to a number
of threats to validity, as discussed below.
9.3 Threats to validity
The threemain types of validity threats to our study are exter-
nal, internal, and construct validity.
External validity. Our experimental design is subject to
various threats to external validity; the obtained results may
not generalize to other cases. First, a threat concerns the
expressiveness of our language for catering to a wide variety
of scenarios with their distinct requirements: Our experimen-
tal material was based on one particular case study. A more
comprehensive study with a greater variety of case study is
left to future work. Second, we relied to a large extent on stu-
dents as participants in the study. We provided the rationale
for this decision in Sect. 9.1.
Internal validity. A threat to internal validity is experi-
menter expectation. Subjective assessments, such as those
regarding the usefulness, may be affected by apparent
expectations. Specifically, in RQ2, participants might have
assessed our technique positively without having understood
its output. We point out that the participants were presented
with detailed insights as provided by our technique, including
a highlighting of the offending model elements and textual
error messages such as: “Error: The process requires anony-
mous execution for a task that writes data to a secure storage,
where the executor should not be able to deny that she mod-
ified data.” We argue that this kind of feedback is a key
for establishing understandability. In line with this rationale
and related positive textual feedback, the majority of partic-
ipants assessed the helpfulness of our technique positively.
The lower average score for the case of potential conflicts
may come from this case being harder to understand.
Construct validity. The validity of our experiments may
be disputed due to constructing validity. When studying the
practical applicability of our approach, we only considered
the output of the conflict detection technique, rather the full
process, including the assumption that the user manually
annotates the involved BPMN model. Even though annotat-
ing the models is an involved task, the resulting annotations
arguably provide several benefits for communication and get-
ting an intuitive overviewof the contained requirements. This
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task can be made easier by providing appropriate tool sup-
port, as shown in our earlier work [70].
10 Related work
Having given an on overview of existing BPMN security-
oriented extensions and their limitations in Sect. 2, we now
provide a comprehensive discussion of other related work in
the field of security engineering.
10.1 Conflicts between data-protection
requirements
To our knowledge, no existing approach supports conflict
detection between security, data-minimization, and fair-
ness requirements. For example, Hansen et al. [30] define
six privacy and security goals for supporting the privacy
needs of users. The authors considered a subset of the
data-minimization concepts in [53], namely anonymity and
unlinkability, and discuss their relationships. However, con-
flicts are discussed on the conceptual level, abstracting from
concrete systems, while we show that the specific conflicts
arising in a system can be identified by analyzing the data
system’s minimization and security requirements.
Theperspective papers ofGanji et al. [27] andAlkubaisy [5]
highlight the importance of detecting conflicts between
security and privacy requirements, specifically for data-
minimization requirements. Both papers discuss the com-
ponents required for a potential approach, however, without
providing a complete solution. Ganji et al. [27] envision a
realization based on the SecureTropos framework as future
work.
10.2 Model-based conflict detection approaches
We are not the first to use models for detecting conflicts
between data-protection properties. Paja et al. [51] propose
an extension of sociotechnical systems (STS), a security
goal-oriented approach, to allow checking if the stake-
holders have conflicting authorization requirements such
as who allowed to read, delete, modify, and transfer data
and for which purpose. Different from our approach, this
approach does not support conflict detection between secu-
rity, data-minimization, and fairness requirements. However,
our approach can be seen as a complementary to this one due
to the following reasons: first, the prototypical implementa-
tion of our work is developed on top of the STS environment,
which supports the BPMN extension SecBPMN2 [67]. Sec-
ond, a technique that supports the transformation from STS
models to SecBPMN2 models is available [68].
Elahi et al. [22] propose an extension to a goal-oriented
modeling language called i* to model and analyze secu-
rity trade-offs among competing requirements of multiple
users. The main goal is to allow identifying an optimal set
of security mechanisms that together can achieve a good-
enough security level without violating usability issues.
However, this researchwork does not consider conflict analy-
sis between security, data-minimization and fairness-related
requirements. Moreover, the authors considered the design
of catalog reusable knowledge about security trade-offs for
automating the trade-offs analysis as part of future work.
Saadatmand et al. [64] propose an approach that auto-
matically, based on a fuzzy logic extension of the TOPSIS
decision-making method, analyzes UML class models anno-
tated with non-functional requirements in order to evaluate
different design alternatives and identify which one leads
to better overall satisfaction of non-functional requirements.
For the same purpose, Pasquale et al. [52] propose to
use the KAOS goal-oriented approach to study interactions
between security requirements such as confidentiality and
other organizational and non-functional requirements such
as cost budget and performance, respectively. The proposed
approach uses a SMT solver to interpret the KAOS mod-
els and automate the execution of the trade-off analyses.
This helps the security engineer in selecting security mecha-
nisms and configurations that can maximize security without
violating other goals such as usability. Different from our
work, these works do not support conflict analysis between
data protection requirements. Instead, they support trade-offs
analysis between security requirements and other quality or
organizational-related requirements such as the usability and
the cost budget, respectively. Furthermore, they do not con-
sider the context of how the requirements interact with each
other. Models are used to support conceptual modeling for
security and quality concepts and the relationships between
them, without considering the target system’s behavior.
10.3 Other conflict detection approaches
The literature is rich with approaches that rely on textually
specified requirements to identify conflicts between them.
A comprehensive overview of these approaches is found in
[4]. In what follows, we discuss the approaches that consider
security or privacy as part of their supported concepts.
Like we do, Egyed et al. [20] argue that detecting con-
flicts between the requirements requires an understanding of
their dependencies. To overcome this challenge, the authors
propose an approach that takes as input a set of textual
non-functional requirements. The approach then automati-
cally finds out the requirements that have trace dependencies
between each other. The trace dependencies are created
among requirements if their test scenarios execute the same
or similar lines of code. In a final step, the approach uses a
matrix of conflicts to decide whether two dependent require-
ments are conflicting or not.
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Mairiza et al. [42] propose a catalog of conflicts between
non-functional concepts. The catalog is a two-dimensional
matrix that shows conflicts between the non-functional
concepts at the conceptual level without considering their
context. The same authors have proposed an ontology-
based framework that aims to manage the relative con-
flicts among non-functional requirements, particularly those
between security and usability requirements [41]. However,
the work does not provide technical details about how the
framework can be automated. Technical support and frame-
work evaluation are proposed as future work.
Poort et al. [54] propose a framework to detect conflicts
between non-functional requirements and suggest strate-
gies to resolve them. For conflict detection, the framework
suggests to group the requirements based on their function-
alities and then study trade-offs between the non-functional
requirements that belong to the same functional requirement.
However, this framework provides only a methodological
solution for conflict detection at a high-level of abstraction
without supporting a concrete solution for how trade-offs
between the requirements can be automatically detected.
Different from our work, the works in [20,41,42,54]
do not support conflict detection between data protection
requirements. Instead, they aim to detect conflicts between
non-functional requirements such as security, usability, effi-
ciency, and maintainability. Surprisingly, although the pro-
posed matrix in [42] considers the privacy and security as
two non-functional concepts, it does not show that privacy
and security can be (potentially) in conflict. Moreover, these
approaches rely on informally textually specified require-
ments to detect conflicts between them, which may lead to
inaccurate results due to inexact semantics.
10.4 Data-minimization-aware approaches
Various works in security requirements engineering aim to
specify privacy requirements using the data minimization
concepts proposed in [53]. In Deng et al.’s [18] LIND-
DUN framework, both misuse cases and data-minimization
requirements can be identified bymapping predefined threat-
tree patterns to the elements of a data flow diagram. Kallo-
niatis et al. [34] propose the Pris methodology, which maps
data minimization and other security concepts to a system’s
organizational goals to identify privacy requirements. Pris
introduces privacy process patterns that describe the effect
of privacy requirements to organizational processes.
Mouratidis et al. [49] present a conceptual framework
that combines security and data-minimization concepts and
show its use to specify details about privacy goals such
as the involved actors and threats. Beckers et al. [9] pro-
pose a privacy threat analysis approach called ProPAn that
uses functional requirements modeled in the problem-frame
approach to check if insiders can gain information about
specific stakeholders. Ahmadian et al. [1] support a privacy
analysis for system design models, based on the four privacy
key elements of purpose, retention, visibility, and granularity.
Diamantopoulou et al. [19] provide a set of privacy process
patterns for security and data-minimization concepts, aiming
to provide predefined solutions for different types of privacy
concerns in the implementation phase. In addition to the tex-
tual description of the patterns, BPMN design patterns were
provided to guide operationalization at the business process
level.
Sincenoneof these approaches considers conflicts between
different data-protection requirements, our approach can be
seen as complementary. Their output can be used as input
for our approach to allow the enrichment of the business pro-
cess models with security, data-minimization, and fairness
requirements and then to perform conflict detection.
10.5 Fairness-aware approaches
Fairness is currently dealt with as an algorithmic prob-
lem at the implementations phase. Approaches in this field
can be classified into detection and prevention approaches.
Approaches of the former type aim to test whether a
given software discriminates against protected data or not.
Approaches of this type can be further classified into while-
box (e.g., [3]) and black-box (e.g., [16,28,73]) approaches.
The trade-offs between fairness and privacy needs are
recently considered as a challenge in the field of algorithmic
fairness [16]. However, so far there exists no approach that
allows modeling fairness requirements and detecting con-
flicts between them and other data-protection requirements
as early as during the design phase of the targeted system.
The need for integrating fairness in the early design stages is
first has been highlighted by our work in [57,58].
11 Limitations
A limitation is that our proposed notation is currently not
equipped with a formal semantics. We provided structured
textual descriptions of all considered data-protection require-
ments. The textual descriptions incorporate feedback from
several rounds of revisions between the authors of this paper,
and from the participants of an earlier experiment [60]. How-
ever, generally speaking, we cannot exclude the existence
of cases that require additional formal investigation. While
doing so is outside the scope of this work, we consider it the
most significant direction for follow-up work.
This paper does not include a systematic performance
evaluation of the conflict detection technique. The perfor-
mance bottleneck is the use of SecBPMN-Q’s query engine.
Previous evaluation results for the engine show that execution
time grows linearly with the number of activities and expo-
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Table 3 Execution time of
conflict detection technique
SecBPMN model Number of BPMN elements Number of annotations Time (s)
Model 1 21 1 24
Model 2 54 7 45
Model 3 92 17 82
nentially with the number of processes [69]. To still offer first
insights into the scalability of our technique, we performed
a preliminary assessment based on our running example,2
showing the results in Table 3. Models 1 and 2 are smaller
versions of the complete model (a.k.a. model 3), which we
produced by removing connected parts. The tests were per-
formed on a computer with a 2.2 Ghz processor and 8 GB of
memory. Taking around 1 min for the largest model and not
showing an exponential slowdown, the performance of our
technique seems adequate for practical use on models of the
considered size.
Moreover, as in any practical software system, we can-
not rule out the possibility of implementation defects in
the implementation of our conflict detection technique. Our
technique is based on declarative conflict patterns, which
are automatically evaluated by a query engine. This pattern-
based approach aims to reduce cognitive complexity during
implementation, and thus may be less error-prone than hard-
coding the technique in a general-purpose language. Yet,
giving proof of this intuition requires additional work.
12 Conclusions and future work
We proposed a BPMN-based framework for supporting the
detection of conflicts between security, data-minimization,
and fairness requirements. To this end, we first proposed an
extension of BPMN that permits the specification of these
requirements in BPMN models, based on existing security
annotations from the SecBPMN2 modeling language [67]
and new data-minimization and fairness annotations.
Based on this extension, first, we enabled checking the
alignment between the security, data-minimization, and fair-
ness requirements and their specifications in the BPMN
models. We automated this process by extending a graphical
query language called SecBPMN2-Q to allow formulating
the requirements as reusable procedural patterns. The pat-
terns can be matched to BPMN models from the same
domain. Second, we introduced a technique for conflict
detection between the specified requirements in the BPMN
models. Our technique analyzes enrichedmodels using a cat-
alog of domain-independent conflict anti-patterns,whichwas
created using our SecBPMN2-Q extension as well. Align-
2 Available at https://github.com/QRamadan/SoSyM-conflictsDetec
tion.
ment checking is required to avoid conflicts arising from
changes to the requirements during their specifications in the
business process models, which if detected later will make
the process to find their root causes more difficult.
We validated the feasibility and usability of our conflict
detection techniques based on a case study featuring a health-
care management system, and an experimental user study,
respectively. We outline four important directions for future
work:
First, while we made a systematic effort to assure com-
pleteness and correctness, we did not provide a formal
validation. To address this gap, we suggest to rely on alge-
braic graph transformations in the following way: First,
specify the semantics of each data-protection requirement
using one or several graph transformation rules. The rules
would describe forbidden and intended flows of information
between different actors. Second, we aim to apply a formally
based conflict detection technique [37,38], which can dis-
cover all possible conflicts arising for a set of rules.
Second, we aim to extend our approach to support the
resolution of conflicts. Although a fully automated process
would be appreciated, we believe that the resolution of actual
conflicts (e.g., between two requirements related to differ-
ent views of system users) is a sensitive issue that requires
human intervention, a further challenging task that involves
reasoning on the privacy impact of different solution strate-
gies [2,43]. Once that all conflicts are resolved, the system
design typically needs to be aligned with the specified data
protection requirements, a challenge that can benefit from
the use of model transformation technology [59].
Third, the maintenance of data protection patterns in our
framework largely relies on manual tasks. This is due to
a lack of an automated approach for: (1) mapping textual
requirements to existing domain-specific patterns; (2) cre-
ating patterns for those data-protection requirements that do
not have corresponding patterns. Automating these two tasks
can benefit from existing researchwork such as [68], andwill
allow avoiding badly modeled and duplicated patterns in the
pattern repository.
Fourth, similar to the work in [55], our approach allows
specifying enforcement technologies for data-protection
annotations. In the future, to reduce the number of reported
potential conflicts, we plan to refine our technique to con-
sider the specified enforcement technologies during conflict
detection. This requires as input a database with up-to-date
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Table 4 Mapping privacy threats to BPMN elements
Category Element Privacy Threats
Identifiability Linkability Detectability Observability Discrimination
Flow objects Activity • ◦ • ◦ •
Event – – – – –
Gateway – – – – –
Data objects Data object ◦ • ◦ ◦ –
Data store ◦ • ◦ ◦ –
Connect objects Sequence flow – – – – –
Message flow • ◦ • • –
Data association • ◦ • ◦ –
Swimlanes Lane ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ –
Pool ◦ • ◦ ◦ –
information about enforcement technologies and their abili-
ties to preserve data-protection requirements.
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Appendix A: The linkage constraints of our
proposed annotations
In our work, an annotation can be linked with a BPMN
element if that element may act as a subject to the corre-
sponding privacy threat of that annotation. The underlying
background for our linkage constraints benefits from the
research work of Deng et al. [18] that aims to elicit data-
protection requirements based on the data flow diagram of
a targeted system. However, differently from our work, the
authors in [18] mapped every privacy threat to all elements of
the data flow diagram, while in our work, we argue that some
privacy threats are the consequence of other threats in the sys-
tem.Thus,wemapped the privacy threats to specific elements
in a restricted list of BPMNmodel elements to avoid the over-
lapping meaning of different data-minimization annotations.
Generally, Table 4 shows that theBPMNactivities,data asso-
ciations, data objects, and message flows can be subject to
one or more privacy threats.
In ourwork,we consider the following threats: (i) identify-
ing data subjects who their real identity should be uncovered
for privacy reasons (Identifiability), (ii) linking different
activities or data from different sources as related (Link-
ability), (iii) leaking sensitive information about private
communications or stored data even if they are encrypted
(Detectability), (iv) identifying data subject by insiders and
detecting privacy information about them by outsiders if hap-
pen together they can lead to the so-called Observability
threat, and (V) discriminating data subjects on the ground
of protected data (e.g., gender) (Discrimination). The afore-
mentioned threats can be mitigated by achieving the data
protection goals behind our proposed annotations, respec-
tively, as follows: Anonymity,Unlinkability,Undetectability,
Unobservability, and Fairness. Table 4 displays the mapping
between the basic elements of BPMN and the set of pri-
vacy threats such as identifiability, linkability, detectability,
observability, and discrimination.
Each intersection in Table 4 marked with the symbol
(•) indicates a potential privacy threat at the corresponding
BPMN element. This is because these elements can be used
to either: (i) store sensitive data (e.g., data object), (ii) repre-
sent sensitive activity/process (e.g., activity) or (iii) transmit
sensitive data (e.g.,message flow).Consider for instancemes-
sages being transmitted over amessage flow. Thesemessages
can be subject to a number of privacy threats such as iden-
tifiability where adversaries can trace back a message to its
actual sender, detectability where adversaries are able to dis-
tinguish true messages from false ones, and observability
where both the messages are detectable and the sender of
these messages is identifiable by adversaries. These threats
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can bemitigated by achieving the anonymity, undetectability,
and unobservability data-minimization needs, respectively.
Entries with the symbol (–) in Table 4 indicate that the
BPMN element cannot be subjected to the corresponding
privacy threats. Table 4 shows that none of the privacy threats
can be mapped to events, gateways, and sequence flows. The
rationale of this is that these BPMN elements do not store,
process, or transmit personal information. More precisely, as
defined in the BPMN 2.0 [7] specification, these elements
can be used to either show/control the order of activities in
a BPMN model such as sequence flows and gateways or to
represent changes in the environment of the system such as
events. Therefore, we did not consider them as subject to
privacy threats.
The symbol (◦) in Table 4 indicates that the BPMN ele-
ment can be subject to the corresponding privacy threats.
However, because these threats are the consequences of other
threats, we did not map them to the corresponding BPMN
elements. The main reason for that is to avoid having mul-
tiple annotations whose semantics overlap. For example, a
data object that stores personal identifiable information can
be a subject to the identifiability threat. However, this threat
is the result of performing either an activity that retrieves
a non-anonymized variant of that data object or linking the
data object, in case it is an anonymized data object related
to another non-anonymized data object. Since we already
mapped the identifiablitiy threat to the data associations (to
show how the data can be stored to—or retrieved from—a
data object) and the linkability threat to the data objects, there
is no need to map the identifiability threat to the data object.
Appendix B: A full textual description of our
catalog of conflicts
This section provides a full textual description of our catalog
of conflicts (C) and potential conflicts (PC) between security,
fairness, and data minimization requirements.
Non-repudiation Non-repudiation in SecBPMN2 can be
linked with: First, an activity to indicate that it should be
possible to prevent an executor from being able to deny that
she executed the activity. Second, a data object to imposing
that it should be possible to prevent an accessor to the data
object from being able to deny that she read/modified data
in that data object. Third, a message flow to specify that it
should be possible to prevent a sender from being able to
deny that she sent messages.
– C1.1 Non-repudiation versus Anonymity. A conflict
between an anonymity and a non-repudiation require-
ment occurs if the business process model has: (1) an
Anonymity- and a Non-repudiation-annotated task, (2)
an Anonymity- and Non-repudiation-annotated message
flow, (3) an Anonymity-annotated task reads data from a
Non-repudiation-annotated data object (because of dif-
ferent data directions, two anti-patterns are defined),
(4) an Anonymity-annotated task sends messages over a
Non-repudiation-annotated message flow or vice versa
(because of two possible representations, two anti-
patterns are defined), or (5) a task that reads data
from a Non-repudiation-annotated data object and sends
messages over an Anonymity-annotated message flow
(because of different data directions, two anti-patterns
are defined).
– C1.2 Non-repudiation versus Unobservability. A con-
flict between an unobservability and a non-repudiation
requirement occurs if the business process model has:
(1) anUnobservability- and aNon-repudiation-annotated
message flow, (2) an Non-repudiation-annotated task
sends messages over an Unobservability-annotated mes-
sage flow, or (3) a task that reads data from an Non-
repudiation-annotated data object and sends messages
over aUnobservability-annotatedmessage flow (because
of different data directions, two anti-patterns are defined).
– PC1.1 Non-repudiation versus Anonymity. A poten-
tial conflict between an anonymity and a non-repudiation
requirement occurs if the business process model has:
(1) a path between an Anonymity-annotated task and a
Non-repudiation-annotated task, (2) a path between an
Anonymity-annotated task and a task that writes data to
a Non-repudiation-annotated data object (because of dif-
ferent data directions, two anti-patterns are defined), (3)
a path between a task that sends messages over a Non-
repudiation-annotatedmessage flow and a task that sends
messages over anAnonymity-annotatedmessage flow, (4)
a path between an Anonymity-annotated task and a task
that sends messages over a Non-repudiation-annotated
message flow or vice versa (because of the different pos-
sible representations, two anti-patterns are defined), or
(5) a path between a task that reads data from a Non-
repudiation-annotated data object and a task that sends
messages over an Anonymity-annotated message flow
(because of different data directions, two anti-patterns
are defined).
– PC1.2 Non-repudiation versus Unobservability. A
potential conflict between an unobservability and a non-
repudiation requirement occurs if the business process
model has: (1) a path between a task that sends mes-
sages over a Non-repudiation-annotated message flow
and a task that sends messages over an Unobserv-
ability-annotated message flow, (2) a path between a
Non-repudiation-annotated task and a task that sends
messages over Unobservability-annotated message flow,
or (3) a path between a task that reads data from a Non-
repudiation-annotated data object and a task that sends
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messages over an Unobservability-annotated message
flow (because of different data directions, two anti-
patterns are defined).
Accountability Accountability can be linked with activities
and it specifies that the system should hold the executors
of the activities responsible for their actions. Accountability
may conflict with anonymity and unobservability.
– C2.1 Accountability versus Anonymity. A conflict
between an anonymity and an accountability require-
ment occurs if the business process model has: (1) an
Anonymity- and Accountability-annotated task, or (2) an
Accountability-annotated task that sends messages over
an Anonymity-annotated message flow.
– C2.2 Accountability versus Unobservability. A con-
flict between an unobservability and an accountability
requirement occurs if the business process model has:
(1) an Accountability-annotated task that sends messages
over an Anonymity-annotated message flow.
– PC2.1 Accountability versus Anonymity. A potential
conflict between an anonymity and an accountability
requirement occurs if the business process model has:
(1) a path between an Anonymity-annotated task and an
Accountability-annotated task, or (2) a path between an
Accountability-annotated task and a task that sends mes-
sages over an Anonymity-annotated message flow.
– PC2.2Accountability versusUnobservability.Apoten-
tial conflict between an unobservability and an account-
ability requirement occurs if the business process model
has: (1) a path between an Accountability-annotated task
and a task that sends messages over an Unobservability-
annotated message flow.
Authenticity Authenticity in SecBPMN2 can be linked with:
First, an activity to impose that the identity of the activity
executor must be verified. Second, a data object to indicate
that it should be possible to prove the data object is genuine.
– C3.1 Authenticity versus Anonymity. A conflict
between an anonymity and an authenticity require-
ment occurs if the business process model has: (1)
an Anonymity- and Authenticity-annotated task, (2) an
Anonymity-annotated task that writes data to an Authen-
ticity-annotated data object (because of different data
directions, two anti-patterns are defined), (3) an Authen-
ticity-annotated task that sendsmessages over anAnonymity-
annotated message flow, or (4) a task that reads data from
anAuthenticity-annotated data object and sendsmessages
over an Anonymity-annotated message flow (because of
different data directions, two anti-patterns are defined).
– C3.2 Authenticity versus Unobservability. A conflict
between an unobservability and an authenticity require-
ment occurs if the business process model has: (1) an
Authenticity-annotated task that sends messages over an
Unobservability-annotated message flow, or (2) a task
that reads data fromanAuthenticity-annotated data object
and sends messages over an Unobservability-annotated
message flow (because of different data directions, two
anti-patterns are defined).
– PC3.1 Authenticity versus Anonymity. A potential
conflict between an anonymity and an authenticity
requirement occurs if the business process model has:
(1) a path between an Anonymity-annotated task and
an Authenticity-annotated task, (2) a path between an
Anonymity-annotated task and a task thatwrites data to an
Authenticity-annotated data object (because of different
data directions, two anti-patterns are defined), (3) a path
between an Authenticity-annotated task and a task that
sends messages over an Anonymity-annotated message
flow, or (4) a path between a task that reads data from an
Authenticity-annotated data object and a task that sends
messages over an Anonymity-annotated message flow
(because of different data directions, two anti-patterns
are defined).
– PC3.2 Authenticity versus Unobservability. A poten-
tial conflict between an unobservability and an authen-
ticity requirement occurs if the business process model
has: (1) a path between an Authenticity-annotated task
and a task that sends messages over an Unobservabil-
ity-annotated message flow, or (2) a path between a task
that reads data fromanAuthenticity-annotated data object
and a task that sends messages over an Unobservabil-
ity-annotated message flow (because of different data
directions, two anti-patterns are defined).
AudibilityAudibility in SecBPMN2canbe linkedwith: First,
an activity to indicate that it should be possible to keep track
of all the actions performed by the executor of the activity.
Second, a data object to imposing that it should be possible
to keep track of all the actions (e.g., write, read, store) con-
cerning the data object. Third, a message flow to specify that
it should be possible to keep track of all the actions executed
to handle the communication (send/receive actions) within
the message flow.
– C4.1Auditability versusAnonymity.A conflict between
an anonymity and an auditability requirement occurs
if the business process model has: (1) an Anonymity-
and Auditability-annotated task, (2) an Anonymity- and
Auditability-annotated message flow, (3) an Anonymity-
annotated task that reads data from an Auditability-
annotated data object (because of different data direc-
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tions, two anti-patterns are defined), (4) an Anonymity-
annotated task that sends messages over an Auditability-
annotated message flow or vice versa (because of two
possible representations, two anti-patterns are defined),
or (5) a task that reads data from an Auditability-
annotated data object and sends messages over an
Anonymity-annotated message flow (because of different
data directions, two anti-patterns are defined).
– C4.2 Auditability versus Unobservability. A conflict
between an unobservability and an auditability require-
ment occurs if the business process model has: (1)
an Unobservability- and Auditability-annotated message
flow, (2) an Auditability-annotated task sends messages
over an Unobservability-annotated message flow, or (3)
a task that reads data from an Auditability-annotated
data object and sends messages over an Unobservabil-
ity-annotated message flow (because of different data
directions, two anti-patterns are defined).
– PC4.1Auditability versusAnonymity. A potential con-
flict between an anonymity and an auditability require-
ment occurs if the business process model has: (1) a path
between an Anonymity-annotated task and an Auditabil-
ity-annotated task, (2) a path between an Anonymity-
annotated task and a task that writes data to an Auditabil-
ity-annotated data object (because of different data
directions, two anti-patterns are defined), (3) a path
between a task that sends messages over an Auditabil-
ity-annotated message flow and a task sends messages
over an Anonymity-annotated message flow, (5) a path
between an Anonymity-annotated task and a task that
sends messages over an Auditability-annotated message
flow or vice versa (because of the different possible
representations, two anti-patterns are defined), or (6) a
path between a task that reads data from an Auditabil-
ity-annotated data object and a task that sends messages
over an Anonymity-annotated message flow (because of
different data directions, two anti-patterns are defined).
– PC4.2Auditability versusUnobservability.Apotential
conflict between an unobservability and an auditabil-
ity requirement occurs if the business process model
has: (1) a path between a task that sends messages over
an Auditability-annotated message flow and a task that
sends messages over an Unobservability-annotated mes-
sage flow, (2) a path between an Auditability-annotated
task and a task that sends messages over an Unobserv-
ability-annotated message flow, or (3) a path between a
task that reads data from an Auditability-annotated data
object and a task that sends messages over an Unobserv-
ability-annotatedmessage flow (because of different data
directions, two anti-patterns are defined).
Non-delegationNon-delegation inSecBPMN2canbe linked
with an activity and it specifies that the activity shall be exe-
cuted only by the users assigned. Accountabilitymay conflict
with anonymity and unobservability.
– C5.1 Non-delegation versus Anonymity. A conflict
between these two requirements occurs if the BPMN
model has: (1) an Anonymity- and Non-delegation-
annotated task, or (2) a Non-delegation-annotated task
that sends messages over an Anonymity-annotated mes-
sage flow.
– C5.2 Non-delegation versus Unobservability. Since
unobservability can only be linked with message flows,
conflicts between unobservability and non-delegation
requirements occur if the business process model has:
(1) a Non-delegation-annotated task that sends messages
over an Anonymity-annotated message flow.
– PC5.1 Non-delegation versus Anonymity. A poten-
tial conflict between an anonymity and a non-delegation
requirement occurs if the business process model has:
(1) a path between an Anonymity-annotated task and a
Non-delegation-annotated task, or (2) a path between a
Non-delegation-annotated task and a task that sendsmes-
sages over an Anonymity-annotated message flow.
– PC5.2Non-delegationversusUnobservability.Apoten-
tial conflict between an unobservability and a non-
delegation requirement occurs if the business process
model has: (1) a pathbetween aNon-delegation-annotated
task and a task that sends messages over an Unobserv-
ability-annotated message flow.
Binding of Duties Binding of Duties in SecBPMN2 can be
linked with two pools and it specifies that the same person
should be responsible for the completion of a set of related
activities. Binding of duties may conflict with anonymity and
unlinkability.
– P6.1 Binding of Duties versus Anonymity. A con-
flict between an anonymity and a binding of duties
requirement occurs if the business process model has:
(1) two pools that both are annotated with Binding of
Duties, and each one of them includes an Anonymity-
annotated task with the configuration {level=full anony-
mous, insider=true}.
– PC6.1 Binding Of Duties versus Unlinkability. A
potential conflict between an unlinkability and a bind-
ing of duties requirement occurs if the business process
model has: (1) a Binding Of Duty- and Unlinkability-
annotated two pools, where the latter has the configura-
tion {insider=true}.
AnonymityAnonymity as specified inSect. 4 canbe specified
differently based on the anonymity level (i.e., full anonymous
vs. pseudonymous) and the type of adversaries considered
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(i.e., outsider+insider vs. only outsider adversaries). Thus,
anonymity requirements may conflict with other data mini-
mization requirements.
– C7.1AnonymityversusAnonymity.A conflict between
two anonymity requirements occurs if the BPMN model
has: (1) anAnonymity-annotated task that sendsmessages
over an Anonymity-annotated message flow, the former
with the configuration {level = full anonymous} and the
latter with the configuration {level = pseudonymity}, or
vice versa. (because of two possible representations, two
anti-patterns are defined), or (2) an Anonymity-annotated
task that sends messages over an Anonymity-annotated
message flow, the former with the configuration {insider
= false} and the latter with the configuration {insider =
true}, or vice versa (because of two possible representa-
tions, two anti-patterns are defined).
– C7.2 Anonymity versus Unobservability. A conflict
between an anonymity and an unobservability require-
ment occurs if the business process model has: (1)
an Anonymity- and Unobservability-annotated message
flow, the former with the configuration {insider = false},
or (2) an Anonymity-annotated task that sends messages
over anUnobservability-annotatedmessage flow, the for-
mer with the configuration {level = pseudonymous}.
– PC7.1 Anonymity versus Anonymity. A potential con-
flict between two anonymity requirements occurs if the
business process model has: (1) a path between two
Anonymity-annotated tasks, the second with configura-
tion {level = pseudonymous}, (2) a path between two
tasks that send messages over an Anonymity-annotated
message flow, the first with the configuration {level=
pseudonymous}, (3) a path between two tasks that send
messages over anAnonymity-annotatedmessageflow, the
first with the configuration {insider = false}, (4) a path
between an Anonymity-annotated task and a task that
sends messages over an Anonymity-annotated message
flow, the latter with the configuration {insider = false},
or (5) a path between an Anonymity-annotated task and
a task that sends messages over an Anonymity-annotated
message flow, the latter with the configuration {level =
pseudonymous}.
– PC7.2 Anonymity versus Unobservability. A poten-
tial conflict between these two requirements occurs if
the business process model has: (1) a path between
a task that sends messages over an Anonymity anno-
tated message flow and a task that sends messages over
an Unobservability-annotated message flow, the former
with the configuration {level = pseudonymity}, or (2) a
path between an Anonymity-annotated task and a task
that sends messages over an Unobservability-annotated
message flow, the former with the configuration {level =
pseudonymous}.
Separation of Duties Separation of Duties in SecBPMN2
can be linked with two pools and it specifies that two or more
distinct persons should be responsible for the completion of
a set of related activities. Separation of duties may conflict
with anonymity.
– C8.1 Separation-of-Duties versus Anonymity. A con-
flict between an anonymity and a separation-of-duties
requirement occurs if theBPMNmodel has: (1) twopools
being annotated with Separation-of-Duties, and each one
of them includes an Anonymity-annotated task with the
configuration {level = full anonymous, insider= true}.
Confidentiality Confidentiality in SecBPMN2 can be linked
with: first, a data object to impose that only authorized users
can read data from the data object. Second, a message flow
to specify that only authorized users can receive and read the
messages on that message flow.
– PC9.1 Confidentiality versus Anonymity. A poten-
tial conflict between an anonymity and a confidentiality
requirement occurs if the business process model has: (1)
anAnonymity-annotated task that reads data fromaConfi-
dentiality-annotated data object (because of the different
possible representations, two anti-patterns are defined),
(2) a path between an Anonymity-annotated task and a
task that reads data from aConfidentiality-annotated data
object (because of different data directions, two anti-
patterns are defined), (3) a path between a task that reads
data from a Confidentiality-annotated data object and a
task the sends messages over an Anonymity-annotated
message flow (because of the different possible repre-
sentations, two anti-patterns are defined), or (4) a task
that reads data from a Confidentiality-annotated data
object and sends messages over an Anonymity-annotated
message flow (because of the different possible represen-
tations, two anti-patterns are defined).
– PC9.2Confidentiality versusUnobservability.Apoten-
tial conflict between an unobservability and a confiden-
tiality requirement occurs if the business process model
has: (1) a path between a task that reads data from a Con-
fidentiality-annotated data object and a task that sends
messages over an Unobservability-annotated message
flow (because of the different possible representations,
two anti-patterns are defined), or (2) a task that reads data
from a Confidentiality-annotated data object and sends
messages over an Unobservability-annotated message
flow (because of the different possible representations,
two anti-patterns are defined).
Integrity Integrity can be linked with: first, a data object to
impose that only authorized users can read data from the data
123
A semi-automated BPMN-based framework for detecting conflicts between security… 1223
object. Second, amessageflow to specify that only authorized
users can receive and read the messages on that message
flow. Third, a task to impose that only authorized users can
do changes to the functionalities of the task.
– PC10.1 Integrity versus Anonymity. A potential con-
flict between an anonymity and an integrity requirement
occurs if the business process model has: (1) an Integrity-
and Anonymity-annotated task, (2) a path between an
Integrity-annotated task and an Anonymity-annotated
task, (3) an Anonymity-annotated task that reads data
from an Integrity-annotated data object (because of the
different possible representations, two anti-patterns are
defined), (4) a path between anAnonymity-annotated task
and a task that reads data from an Integrity-annotated
data object (because of different data directions, two
anti-patterns are defined), (5) a path between a task
reads data from an Integrity-annotated data object and
a task that sends messages over an Anonymity-annotated
message flow (because of the different possible represen-
tations, two anti-patterns are defined), (6) a task that reads
data from an Integrity-annotated data object and sends
messages over an Anonymity-annotated message flow
(because of the different possible representations, two
anti-patterns are defined), or (7) an Integrity-annotated
task that sends messages over an Anonymity-annotated
message flow.
– PC10.2 Integrity versus Unobservability. A poten-
tial conflict between an unobservability and an integrity
requirement occurs if the business process model has:
(1) a path between a Integrity-annotated task and a task
that sends messages over an Unobservability-annotated
message flow, (2) an Integrity-annotated task that sends
messages over an Unobservability-annotated message
flow, (3) a path between a task that reads data from an
Integrity-annotated data object and a task the sends mes-
sages over an Unobservability-annotated message flow
(because of the different possible representations, two
anti-patterns are defined), or (4) a task that reads data
from an Integrity-annotated data object and sends mes-
sages over an Unobservability-annotated message flow
(because of the different possible representations, two
anti-patterns are defined).
Availability Availability in SecBPMN2 can be linked with:
first, a data object to impose that the data object should be
available when required by authorized users. Second, a mes-
sage flow to specify that the transmission media that will be
used to transfermessages should be availablewhen requested
by authorized users. Third, a task should be ready for execu-
tion by authorized users whenever the task is encountered in
the control flow of the business process.
– PC11.1 Availability versus Anonymity. A potential
conflict between an anonymity and an availability require-
ment occurs if the business process model has: (1)
an Availability- and Anonymity-annotated task, (2) a
path between an Availability-annotated task and an
Anonymity-annotated task, (3) an Anonymity-annotated
task that reads data from an Availability-annotated data
object (because of the different possible representations,
two anti-patterns are defined), (4) a path between an
Anonymity-annotated task and a task that reads data from
an Availability-annotated data object (because of differ-
ent data directions, two anti-patterns are defined), (5)
a path between a task reads data from an Availability-
annotated data object and a task that sends messages
over an Anonymity-annotated message flow (because of
the different possible representations, two anti-patterns
are defined), (6) a task that reads data from an Avail-
ability-annotated data object and sends messages over
an Anonymity-annotated message flow (because of the
different possible representations, two anti-patterns are
defined), or (7) an Availability-annotated task that sends
messages over an Anonymity-annotated message flow.
– PC11.2 Availability versus Unobservability. A poten-
tial conflict between an unobservability and an avail-
ability requirement occurs if the business process model
has: (1) a path between an Availability-annotated task
and a task that sends messages over an Unobservabil-
ity-annotatedmessage flow, (2) anAvailability-annotated
task that sends messages over an Unobservability-
annotated message flow, (3) a path between a task that
reads data from an Availability-annotated data object
and a task the sends messages over an Unobservability-
annotatedmessage flow (because of the different possible
representations, two anti-patterns are defined), or (4)
a task that reads data from an Availability-annotated
data object and sends messages over an Unobservability-
annotatedmessage flow (because of the different possible
representations, two anti-patterns are defined).
Fairness Fairness as specified in Sect. 4 can be linked with
a task BPMN element. This annotation can be specified dif-
ferently based on: first, the data that should not be subject to
discrimination. Second, the data that their effect on the output
can be justifiable due to business needs. These two kinds of
data can be specified using the protect and the useExplana-
tory attributes, respectively. Thus fairness requirements may
conflict with other data minimization requirements. In spe-
cific situations, two fairness requirements may also have a
conflict with each other. However, since a conflict situation
between fairness and another requirement depends on how
the protect and the useExplanatory attributes of the fairness
annotation are specified. Since the specifications of these two
attributes are domain-dependent, we define the conflict situ-
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ations as constrained conflict situations such that if a match
for the situation is found in an input model a corresponding
constraint should be satisfied in order to report a conflict.
– C12.1 Fairness versus Undetectability. In our work, a
conflict between a fairness and an undetectability anno-
tation can be reported:
if
(




f air .get Protected( ) ∪ f air .get Explanatory( ))
⋂
undetect .get Protected( ) = ∅
Here,m is aSecBPMN2model, f air .get Explanatory( )
and f air .get Protected( ) retrieve the set of data defined
by f air as explanatory and protected data, respectively.
The undetect .get Protected( ) retrieves the set of data
specified as protected by undetect .
– C12.2 Fairness versus Fairness. In our work, a conflict
between two fairness requirements can be reported:
if
(
the CC2 of Fig. 9a is matched in m
)
and
f air1.get Explanatory()∩ f air2.get Protected() = ∅
Here,m is aSecBPMN2model, f air1.get Explanatory( )
and f air2.get Protected( ) retrieve the set of data that
are defined as explanatory and protected data, respec-
tively.
– PC12.1 Fairness versus Anonymity. In our work, a
potential conflict between a fairness annotation and an
anonymity annotation can be reported:
if
(




f air .get Protected( ) ∪ f air .get Explanatory( ))
⋂
anon.get Protected( ) = ∅
Here, m is a SecBPMN2 model, anon.get Protected( )
retrieves the set of data that are specified as protected
by the matched anonymity annotation in m. Both the
f air .get Explanatory( ) and f air .get Protected( )
retrieve the set of data that are defined by the matched
fairness annotation in m as explanatory and protected
data, respectively.
References
1. Ahmadian, A.S., Strüber, D., Riediger, V., Jürjens, J.: Model-based
privacy analysis in industrial ecosystems. In: European Confer-
ence on Modelling Foundations and Applications, pp. 215–231.
Springer (2017)
2. Ahmadian, A.S., Strüber, D., Riediger, V., Jürjens, J.: Supporting
privacy impact assessment by model-based privacy analysis. In:
ACM Symposium on Applied Computing. ACM (2018)
3. Albarghouthi, A., D’Antoni, L., Drews, S., Nori, A.: Fairness as a
program property. ArXiv preprint arXiv:1610.06067 (2016)
4. Aldekhail,M., Chikh, A., Ziani, D.: Software requirements conflict
identification: review and recommendations. Int. J. Adv. Comput.
Sci. Appl. 7(10), 326–335 (2016)
5. Alkubaisy, D.: A framework managing conflicts between secu-
rity and privacy requirements. In: International Conference on
Research Challenges in Information Science, pp. 427–432. IEEE
(2017)
6. Arsac, W., Compagna, L., Pellegrino, G., Ponta, S.E.: Security val-
idation of business processes via model-checking. ESSoS 6542,
29–42 (2011)
7. BPMN 2.0. http://www.omg.org/spec/BPMN/2.0/
8. Barocas, S., Selbst, A.D.: Big data’s disparate impact. Calif. L.
Rev. 104, 671 (2016)
9. Beckers, K., Faßbender, S., Heisel, M., Meis, R.: A problem-
based approach for computer-aided privacy threat identification.
In: Annual Privacy Forum, pp. 1–16. Springer (2012)
10. Brucker, A.D., Hang, I., Lückemeyer, G., Ruparel, R.:
SecureBPMN: modeling and enforcing access control require-
ments in business processes. In: ACM Symposium on Access
Control Models and Technologies, pp. 123–126. ACM (2012)
11. Bürger, J., Strüber, D., Gärtner, S., Ruhroth, T., Jürjens, J., Schnei-
der, K.: A framework for semi-automated co-evolution of security
knowledge and systemmodels. J. Syst. Softw. 139, 142–160 (2018)
12. Calders, T., Verwer, S.: Three naive Bayes approaches for
discrimination-free classification. DataMin. Knowl. Discov. 21(2),
277–292 (2010)
13. Charness, G., Gneezy, U., Kuhn, M.A.: Experimental methods:
between-subject and within-subject design. J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
81(1), 1–8 (2012)
14. Chaum, D.: Security without identification: transaction systems to
make big brother obsolete. Commun. ACM 28(10), 1030–1044
(1985)
15. Datta, A.: Fairness and Privacy Violations in Black-Box Personal-
ization Systems: Detection and Defenses. Ph.D. Thesis, Carnegie
Mellon University (2018)
16. Datta, A., Fredrikson, M., Ko, G., Mardziel, P., Sen, S.:
Proxy non-discrimination in data-driven systems. ArXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.08120 (2017)
17. Datta, A., Fredrikson,M., Ko, G.,Mardziel, P., Sen, S.: Use privacy
in data-driven systems: theory and experimentswithmachine learnt
programs. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’17, pp. 1193–
1210. ACM (2017)
18. Deng, M., Wuyts, K., Scandariato, R., Preneel, B., Joosen, W.:
A privacy threat analysis framework: supporting the elicitation
and fulfillment of privacy requirements. Requir. Eng. 16(1), 3–32
(2011)
19. Diamantopoulou, V., Argyropoulos, N., Kalloniatis, C., Gritzalis,
S.: Supporting the design of privacy-aware business processes via
privacy process patterns. In: International Conference on Research
Challenges in Information Science, pp. 187–198. IEEE (2017)
20. Egyed, A., Grunbacher, P.: Identifying requirements conflicts and
cooperation: how quality attributes and automated traceability can
help. IEEE Softw. 21(6), 50–58 (2004)
21. Eiter, T., Faber, W., Leone, N., Pfeifer, G., Polleres, A.: Planning
under incomplete knowledge. Proc. Comput. Log. 1861, 807–821
(2000)
22. Elahi, G., Yu, E.: A goal oriented approach for modeling and
analyzing security trade-offs. In: International Conference on Con-
ceptual Modeling, pp. 375–390. Springer (2007)
23. Fantinato, M., Toledo, M.B.F.D., Thom, L.H., Gimenes, I.M.D.S.,
Rocha, R.D.S., Garcia, D.G.Z.: A survey on reuse in the business
process management domain. Int. J. Bus. Process Integr. Manag.
6(1), 52–76 (2012)
123
A semi-automated BPMN-based framework for detecting conflicts between security… 1225
24. Feldman, M., Friedler, S.A., Moeller, J., Scheidegger, C., Venkata-
subramanian, S.: Certifying and removing disparate impact. In:
Proceedings of the 21th ACM SIGKDD International Conference
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pp. 259–268. ACM
(2015)
25. Ferraiolo, D., Cugini, J., Kuhn, D.R.: Role-based access control
(RBAC): features and motivations. In: Proceedings of 11th Annual
Computer Security Application Conference, pp. 241–48 (1995)
26. General Act on Equal Treatment (2009)
27. Ganji, D., Mouratidis, H., Gheytassi, S.M., Petridis, M.: Conflicts
between security and privacy measures in software requirements
engineering. In: International Conference on Global Security,
Safety, and Sustainability, pp. 323–334. Springer (2015)
28. Gupta,M., Cotter, A., Fard,M.M.,Wang, S.: Proxy fairness. ArXiv
preprint arXiv:1806.11212 (2018)
29. Gürses, S., Troncoso, C., Diaz, C.: Engineering privacy by design.
Comput. Priv. Data Prot. 14(3), 25 (2011)
30. Hansen,M., Jensen,M.,Rost,M.: Protection goals for privacy engi-
neering. In: 2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW),
pp. 159–166. IEEE (2015)
31. Houmb, S.H., Islam, S., Knauss, E., Jürjens, J., Schneider, K.:
Eliciting security requirements and tracing them to design: an inte-
gration of Common Criteria, heuristics, and UMLsec. Requir. Eng.
15(1), 63–93 (2010)
32. Ingold, D., Soper, S.: Amazon doesn’t consider the race of its cus-
tomers. Should it? https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-
amazon-same-day/ (2016)
33. ISO, IEC: Common criteria for information technology security
evaluation—Part 2 security functional components. In: ISO/IEC
15408, International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (2012)
34. Kalloniatis, C., Kavakli, E., Gritzalis, S.: Addressing privacy
requirements in system design: the PriS method. Requir. Eng.
13(3), 241–255 (2008)
35. Kim, M., Park, S., Sugumaran, V., Yang, H.: Managing require-
ments conflicts in software product lines: a goal and scenario based
approach. Data Knowl. Eng. 61(3), 417–432 (2007)
36. Labda, W., Mehandjiev, N., Sampaio, P.: Modeling of privacy-
aware business processes in BPMN to protect personal data. In:
ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, pp. 1399–1405. ACM
(2014)
37. Lambers, L., Born, K., Kosiol, J., Strüber, D., Taentzer, G.: Gran-
ularity of conflicts and dependencies in graph transformation
systems: a two-dimensional approach. J. Log. Algebr. Methods
Program. 103, 105–129 (2019)
38. Lambers, L., Strüber, D., Taentzer, G., Born, K., Huebert, J.: Multi-
granular conflict and dependency analysis in software engineering
based on graph transformation. In: International Conference on
Software Engineering, pp. 716–727. IEEE/ACM (2018)
39. Leone, N., Pfeifer, G., Faber, W., Eiter, T., Gottlob, G., Perri, S.,
Scarcello, F.: The DLV system for knowledge representation and
reasoning. ACM Trans. Comput. Log. 7(3), 499–562 (2006)
40. Maines, C.L., Llewellyn-Jones, D., Tang, S., Zhou, B.: A cyber
security ontology for BPMN-security extensions. In: International
Conference on Computer and Information Technology; Ubiqui-
tous Computing and Communications; Dependable, Autonomic
and Secure Computing, pp. 1756–1763. IEEE (2015)
41. Mairiza, D., Zowghi, D.: An ontological framework to manage the
relative conflicts between security and usability requirements. In:
2010 Third International Workshop on Managing Requirements
Knowledge (MARK), pp. 1–6. IEEE (2010)
42. Mairiza, D., Zowghi, D., Nurmuliani, N.: Towards a catalogue
of conflicts among non-functional requirements. In: International
Conference on Evaluation of Novel Approaches to Software Engi-
neering. SciTePress (2010)
43. Meis, R., Heisel,M.: Systematic identification of information flows
from requirements to support privacy impact assessments. In: Inter-
national Joint Conference on Software Technologies, vol. 2, pp.
1–10. IEEE (2015)
44. Mendes, R., Vilela, J.P.: Privacy-preserving data mining: methods,
metrics, and applications. IEEE Access 5, 10562–10582 (2017)
45. Menzel, M., Thomas, I., Meinel, C.: Security requirements spec-
ification in service-oriented business process management. In:
International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security,
pp. 41–48. IEEE (2009)
46. Mohr, A.: A Survey of Zero-Knowledge Proofs with Applications
to Cryptography, pp. 1–12. Southern Illinois University, Carbon-
dale (2007)
47. Moody, D.: The “physics” of notations: toward a scientific basis for
constructing visual notations in software engineering. IEEE Trans.
Softw. Eng. 35(6), 756–779 (2009)
48. Morton, A., Sasse, M.A.: Privacy is a process, not a PET: a theory
for effective privacy practice. In: Proceedings of the 2012 Work-
shop on New Security Paradigms, pp. 87–104. ACM (2012)
49. Mouratidis, H., Kalloniatis, C., Islam, S., Huget, M.P., Gritzalis,
S.: Aligning security and privacy to support the development of
secure information systems. J. UCS 18(12), 1608–1627 (2012)
50. Mülle, J., von Stackelberg, S., Böhm, K.: A Security Language for
BPMN Process Models. KIT, Fakultät für Informatik (2011)
51. Paja, E., Dalpiaz, F., Giorgini, P.: Managing security requirements
conflicts in socio-technical systems. In: International Conference
on Conceptual Modeling, pp. 270–283. Springer (2013)
52. Pasquale, L., Spoletini, P., Salehie, M., Cavallaro, L., Nuseibeh,
B.: Automating trade-off analysis of security requirements. Requir.
Eng. 21(4), 481–504 (2016)
53. Pfitzmann,A.,Hansen,M.:A terminology for talking about privacy
by data minimization: anonymity, unlinkability, unobservability,
pseudonymity, and identitymanagement. In: TUDresden andULD
Kiel, Techical Report (2011)
54. Poort, E.R., de With, P.: Resolving requirement conflicts through
non-functional decomposition. In: Proceedings of theFourthWork-
ing IEEE/IFIP Conference on Software Architecture (WICSA
2004), pp. 145–154. IEEE (2004)
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